By Daniel Haile*
KILLEEN, Texas, USA | 26 July 2024 (IDN) — The global indifference to one of the deadliest civil and proxy wars is fueling the conflict in Sudan—and the shameful abandonment should ignite condemnation and anger within the international community.
The departure of Omar Al-Bashir, the strongman of Nubia, has plunged Sudan into a brutal civil war, largely ignored by the international media. The ongoing conflict threatens to turn Sudan into another failed state akin to Somalia, Libya, and Syria. This transformation creates a fertile ground for Islamic non-state actors, mirroring the situations in Somalia, Libya, Nigeria, and Syria.
Nubian Game of Thrones
Omar Al-Bashir, an enigmatic strongman, ruled Sudan with an iron fist for three decades following his ascent to power in a 1989 coup d’état, only to be deposed in another coup in 2019. Indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide in Darfur, he harbored Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda members in the 1990s and orchestrated the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to fortify his regime’s security. Machiavellian traits are prerequisites for Sudanese strongmen, and unlike his predecessors, Al-Bashir adeptly played the Nubian Game of Thrones. With thirty-five military coups since 1956, Sudan demands leaders with political and military acumen.
Currently, Sudan is a battleground between two prominent figures: General Abdel Fattah Burhan, Commanding General of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” leader of the RSF. The RSF, originally constituted from the Janjaweed militia implicated in genocide in Darfur, was institutionalized as a military force by the Sudanese parliament in 2015.
The 2019 coup witnessed a strategic alliance between Burhan and Hemedti to depose Al-Bashir and undermine Sudan’s nascent democratic revolution. The resulting Transitional Sovereignty Council, composed of the SAF, RSF, and civilian representatives, elected Abdalla Hamdok as Prime Minister. However, political turmoil persisted, culminating in Burhan orchestrating a coup in October 2021 to remove Hamdok and suspend the constitution. Sudan has since descended into conflict, with factions competing for control over territory, national resources, illicit trade, the security apparatus, and political authority. What began as a civil conflict has evolved into a proxy battleground involving regional and global actors pursuing geopolitical and geoeconomic interests.
Foreign Influence
Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia’s pragmatic approach to a ceasefire between the SAF and RSF in Sudan has yielded no concrete resolution. Riyadh backs Burhan based on assessments favoring his potential victory while hesitating to support Hemedti due to the RSF’s past atrocities and current allegations of abuses. This stance aligns with Saudi Arabia’s modernization under Mohammed Bin Salman and the NEOM project, aiming to avoid association with a global pariah like Hemedti and protect its international standing.
Iran: Tehran has gradually become an influential player since re-establishing diplomatic relations in 2024 after Khartoum cut ties in 2016. Iran is now providing the SAF with Mohajer-6 drones, seeking geostrategic influence in Khartoum to aid the Houthis and establish a foothold in the Red Sea beyond Sana’a. In the 1990s, under Omar Al-Bashir and Hassan Al-Turabi, Sudan was a state sponsor of terrorism, supporting groups like Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Abu Nidal Organization, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Khartoum’s history of supporting both Sunni and Shia non-state actors presents Iran with opportunities for alliances despite divergent Middle Eastern geopolitical interests.
Egypt: Sudan’s stability is paramount to Cairo’s strategic imperatives. Facing the prospect of neighboring two failed states, Libya and Sudan, Egypt also confronts the potential mass migration of Palestinian refugees to the Sinai. Currently hosting 213,000 Sudanese refugees, Egypt grapples with economic challenges, including high unemployment and inflation. The construction of a new administrative capital outside Cairo, anticipated to exceed $50 billion, underscores Sudanese stability’s critical role in revitalizing Egypt’s tourism industry, strained by the Gaza conflict and lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. El-Sisi’s backing of Burhan, both former generals, reflects a logical and strategic alignment. The longstanding relationship between the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and SAF, coupled with the shared threat from Islamist extremists, reinforces Cairo’s political and military influence. However, the enduring ties between elements of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt since 1954 pose an existential challenge to El-Sisi and, to a lesser extent, Burhan.
Ukraine: Kyiv’s engagement in Sudan is geared towards countering Russian private military company (PMC) forces, particularly the Wagner Group. Ukraine supported Burhan by deploying intelligence officers and special forces, reciprocating with weapons during Ukraine’s conflict with Russia. The Wagner Group’s activities in Sudan primarily safeguard mining concessions tied to Russian companies and advance Russian interests for a naval base in Port Sudan. Ukraine’s role in Sudan has significantly diminished following Prigozhin’s departure, with Russia aligning more closely with Iran in supporting Burhan and the SAF.
Eritrea: Asmara keeps its support for Burhan or Hemedti quiet and maintains secrecy about its regional geopolitical interests. Eritrea’s pragmatic leadership is more inclined to align with the Saudi camp, as it did by switching from Qatar to the Saudi coalition against the Houthis. Eritrea granted the UAE a military base for operations against the Houthis, and there are allegations of Eritrea establishing military training camps along the Sudanese border to train Sudanese troops. Eritrea’s history of training 5,000 Somali soldiers to fight Al-Shabaab suggests that training Sudanese soldiers would be consistent with past practices.
UAE: Abu Dhabi, a significant player in the Middle East, exerts military power and influence across Libya, Yemen, Eritrea, and Sudan. The UAE’s intricate ties with Hemedti originated in Yemen and Libya, where Hemedti deployed RSF mercenaries against the Houthis and in Libya. Abu Dhabi’s most profitable association with Hemedti revolves around Sudan’s extensive natural resources and the illicit gold trade.
Russia: Moscow covertly orchestrated support for Hemedti through Wagner, leveraging the illicit gold trade to benefit both parties and evade international sanctions, funding its operations in Ukraine. Hemedti received weapons, ammunition, air transportation assets, and fuel, enhancing his tactical capabilities. The RSF controls Sudan’s gold mining sector, particularly in Darfur, where Wagner has operated since 2017. Russia’s primary strategic interest in Sudan extends beyond gold smuggling to establishing a naval base on the Red Sea. Following Prigozhin’s death, Moscow has scaled back support for Hemedti to maintain perceived neutrality amidst backing from Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for Burhan.
Qatar: Doha has been hesitant to align with either Hemedti or Burhan, preferring the reinstatement of an Islamist government in Khartoum akin to the 1990s under Hassan Al-Turabi. Extremist followers of Turabi persist and are expected to resurface under either Hemedti or Burhan, infiltrating political, military, and civilian sectors similar to the era of Al-Bashir’s regime. Qatar’s strategy involves patiently leveraging humanitarian and economic aid to subvert Khartoum’s political objectives, contributing to a geopolitical rivalry with Riyadh.
Libya: Khalifa Haftar’s alliance with Hemedti is mutually beneficial, as both seek to solidify their regimes and gain legitimacy. Sudan’s border with Libya is a key trade route for smuggling goods that benefit both parties. Haftar supports Hemedti to extend his influence and gain a strategic advantage. Leveraging this alliance, Haftar aims to expand his operations and secure the illicit trade route stretching from Khartoum to Tripoli.
Cost Imposition and Calculus of Collateral Damage
Dictatorial regimes survive by co-opting the ruling class and concentrating the nation’s economic resources among a small group of military officials through coercion, corruption, and clientelism. Sudan exemplifies this model with widespread institutional corruption orchestrated by the military, effectively treating the state as a private enterprise. Sudanese citizens are akin to employees tasked with maximizing profits for the military regime, which governs the country from behind the scenes like shareholders. Politicians act as the board of directors, overseeing daily operations to maximize profits through the forceful subjugation of the population.
The Sudanese military operates as a vehicle for resource exploitation, with the SAF and RSF controlling and managing 250 enterprises that encompass Sudan’s entire economy. These enterprises encompass agriculture, manufacturing, mining, industry, energy, tourism, telecommunications, healthcare, hospitality, transportation, and real estate sectors.
The tragedy in Sudan has been systematically overlooked and neglected, becoming a forgotten crisis both within Africa and on the global stage. It is crucial to note that 24.8 million people suffer from acute food shortages, 10 million have been internally displaced, and since the conflict began, 15,500 civilians have lost their lives. Highlighting the severity of the crisis, the number of displaced people has exceeded figures seen even during the peak of the Syrian civil war, totaling 7.2 million. Despite these alarming statistics, Sudan’s civil war tragically continues to go largely unnoticed.
Sudan’s multidimensional proxy strategy conflict mirrors a real-life Game of Thrones, blending Risk and Axis & Allies elements. Saudi Arabia supports Burhan, and the UAE supports Hemedti. Both states were once allies in campaigns against the Houthis, deposing Gaddafi in Libya, supporting Khalifa Haftar, and participating in the blockade against Qatar. However, in Sudan, their economic and political interests diverge. Saudi Arabia, a bitter rival of Iran in the Middle East, finds itself supporting General Burhan despite Iran’s support for the Houthi in Yemen against the Saudi and UAE-led coalition.
In Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia support Burhan, pitted against the UAE supporting Hemedti. Egypt supports General Burhan and has previously participated in coalitions against the Houthis alongside the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, Egypt opposes the UAE and Khalifa Haftar in Sudan due to their support for Hemedti—nevertheless, both Egypt and the UAE support Khalifa Haftar in Libya.
On the contrary, Russia supports Khalifa Haftar in Libya while reducing its support for Hemedti in Sudan, aiming to maintain neutrality in pursuit of its naval military base ambitions. However, Moscow relies on gold to circumvent Western sanctions and facilitate foreign transactions, especially since 2022, when the Ruble was pegged to gold. Nevertheless, Hemedti controls the most lucrative gold mining areas. Russia’s preference for neutrality in Khartoum could potentially benefit Hemedti, particularly if the conflict with Ukraine persists and Moscow’s demand for gold intensifies.
Qatar and Eritrea have conspicuously refrained from openly endorsing either Hemedti or Burhan, although allegations suggest Eritrea supports Burhan. Qatar’s backing of the NIF poses a national security concern for Eritrea, as the NIF, led by Al-Turabi, financed and trained the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), later renamed the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (EIRM). Eritrea designates the EIRM as a terrorist organization and alleges it supports Al-Qaeda in East Africa.
The presence of the UAE’s military in Somaliland, along with substantial investments exceeding $442 million in the Berbera port’s development, alongside Ethiopia’s plans for a naval base in the secessionist region, heightens tensions among the UAE, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt. These dynamics pit the UAE and Ethiopia against Eritrea and Egypt, who support Somalia’s sovereignty. The fragile peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a potential powder keg, sets the stage for potential proxy conflicts in both Somalia and Sudan.
Egypt’s ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) adds another layer of complexity, potentially drawing Ethiopia into the proxy conflict in Sudan. With Egypt and Eritrea backing Burhan, Ethiopia faces a dilemma: to choose between neutrality or siding with Hemedti. This dynamic further complicates Sudan’s situation and increases the likelihood of regional instability.
Bitter Ending
The conflict in Sudan is a complex and multifaceted proxy war, mirroring the trajectories of Libya and Syria, with civil war exacerbated by the interests of malign foreign actors. Sudan’s potential as prime real estate for Islamic non-state actors could prompt Khartoum to reclaim its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
How bad was Sudan from the 1990s?
Sudan in the 1990s, under the NIF and Hassan Al-Turabi’s leadership, was responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, supporting various non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Abu Nidal Organization, Jamaat al-Islamiya, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and providing refuge to Osama Bin Laden. The Horn of Africa, one of the world’s most unstable regions, should brace itself for another potential failed state in its vicinity.
*The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government. Daniel Haile’s insights are drawn from his personal experiences and research, offering readers an authentic and unfiltered viewpoint on the critical issues discussed. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Collage of pictures by (left) Nezar Bogdawi showing a destroyed building in the Omdurman area of Sudan, where the war has been ongoing since 15 April 2023, and (right) by UNICEF/Ahmed Mohamdeen Elfatih about Children is Sudan facing widespread food insecurity.
