By Jan Servaes*
BRUSSELS | 16 May 2025 (IDN) — The 28 March earthquake, measuring 7.7 on the
Richter scale, has hit Myanmar hard. It was the strongest since 1912, with its
epicenter in Mandalay, the country’s second-most populous city, the United States
Geological Survey reported.
The official death toll continues to rise. By the end of April, 3,800 people had been
killed, 5,100 injured and 116 missing, according to the ASEAN Disaster Relief
Coordination Center (AHA Center). That number has risen to 5,352 dead in
Myanmar and 96 in Thailand. Up to 11,404 people were injured, and hundreds more
were missing, including those from a collapsed construction site in Bangkok.
As Frontier reports from Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay and Sagaing, the vast majority of
relief workers were ill-equipped volunteers with insufficient tools. NASA analyses
show that the ground has shifted as much as 20 feet in some places. Unlike during
disasters such as Typhoon Yagi in 2024 and Cyclone Mocha in 2023, the vastly
more resourced military has generally deployed only small groups of soldiers to
protect prominent buildings, escort visiting generals and clear rubble from important
Buddhist sites. Tatmadaw troops, notably, have not been recalled from the front lines
to help with earthquake relief. Mandalay residents say the military has failed to
prevent looting in the city.
Numerous foreign rescue teams have pulled survivors out of some of the worst-hit
areas, but in some cases, the junta has banned access. Groups that rely on private
donations have seen their budgets shrink in tandem with the economy. Some have
channeled foreign aid, particularly from the West, but President Donald Trump’s
dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) means there is
far less money to distribute.
The substantial aid provided by China and Russia has primarily been channeled
through the junta, making it subject to its whims and minimal transparency.
Aid workers told Frontier that the junta was in disarray and too disorganized to
impose drastic restrictions. With tens of thousands of people still homeless as the
monsoon season approaches, aid agencies warn of major challenges ahead.
But with months of recovery work ahead, the regime is likely to try to exert more
control. It is establishing new reporting rules for aid agencies and journalists.
Western international news outlets, particularly Radio Free Asia and Voice of
America, are also struggling due to Trump’s “decrees”. However, “China is wasting no
time in filling the void left by the US withdrawal from the information sector in the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”
Global media attention is rapidly waning.
The junta’s priorities
Although the military junta declared a ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid to flow, it
has continued aggressive operations – including airstrikes and artillery fire – even
after the ceasefire was supposed to take effect on 2 April. According to the Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), at least 172 attacks occurred
during the first ceasefire, 73 in earthquake-affected areas. In Oe Htein Kwin, a
village about 100 kilometers northwest of the quake’s epicenter, 20 schoolchildren
and two teachers were killed in an airstrike by the junta. UN chief Antonio Guterres
was “deeply shocked” by the reports of the attack, his spokesman told reporters in
New York. He added that “schools must remain places where children can learn
safely and are not bombed.”
Equally alarming is the growing repression within Myanmar’s prison system. In
March 2025, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported that
more than 22,100 people had been charged by the junta since the 2021 coup, of
whom more than 10,700 had been convicted. Although the regime announced a
mass amnesty in April 2025, releasing nearly 4,900 prisoners, there were still 380
political prisoners. At least 87 people died in custody between September and
December 2024 alone, many as a result of torture, denial of medical care and
inhuman treatment. The continued imprisonment of elected officials, journalists,
human rights defenders and student activists illustrates the regime's relentless
campaign to silence dissent.
As Myanmar’s people mourn the dead, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing visited
Bangkok. It was his first trip to a Southeast Asian country since the ASEAN Five-
Point Consensus agreed in Jakarta two months after the 2021 coup. He shook
hands with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi at the 6th Summit of the Heads of State/Government of the Member
States of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation) held in Bangkok on 4 April.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the Global Response to the Coup in
Myanmar (IPI), organized by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR),
already stated in its final report of November 2022 that “it is clear that the Five Point
Consensus has failed and that a new form of engagement is needed.” As a witness
for the IPI noted, “It was abundantly clear from the outset that Min Aung Hlaing was
dishonest in signing it and had no intention of adhering to it.” However, the other
ASEAN leaders also appear to use double standards.
Increasing food insecurity
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) warns that the
earthquake will worsen food insecurity in Myanmar. After four years of war, half of
the 55 million population already lives in poverty, and 3.5 million people were
displaced before the earthquake. The FAO estimated that the quake affected more
than 3.7 million hectares of cropland in the Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway regions
and Shan State. These areas account for a third of Myanmar’s grain and almost 80
per cent of its maize production. The UN agency reported widespread damage to
cropland, storage facilities, agricultural machinery, and irrigation systems. The
agency said the quake also affected Myanmar’s fisheries and “significant” livestock
production.
The “resistance” remains internally divided
It is important to note that ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and anti-coup groups
do not reflect real unity or alliances. Beneath the surface of the anti-military alliance
lurks a deeper internal struggle, shaped by complex divisions over class, ethnicity
and national identity. While most of the Bamar population sees the revolution
primarily as a class struggle against the military elite, the country’s ethnic minorities
see it as a crucial attempt to protect their cultural identity and gain greater autonomy.
These divergent perspectives reflect historical tensions between the Bamar
dominant and Myanmar’s marginalized ethnic groups, exacerbated by decades of
military rule, Burmanization, and the exclusionary politics of the state. Thus, these
tensions between ethnic armed groups and between anti-coup groups do not all
share the same political goals beyond simply fighting the Myanmar military.
Before the earthquake, the military walked with specific ethnic armed organizations,
such as the Kokang Army or the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
(MNTJP/MNDAA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). Both groups are the
Federal Political Negotiations Advisory Committee members, led by the powerful
United Wa State Army.
However, the military has consistently refused to recognize the National Unity
Government (NUG), offer peace talks with the anti-coup groups operating under the
NUG (most active in the two earthquake-affected regions), or acknowledge their
demands.
The military has consistently ignored calls from resistance groups for grassroots
federalism and has never suggested that practical steps would be taken toward
national reconciliation. Instead, the junta leader announced that the December
elections would go as planned, which resistance groups dismissed as a stunt. This
insistence on going ahead with the polls indicates that the military is still uninterested
in meaningful peace negotiations.
The current ceasefire with the MNDAA and the return of Lashio to the military
appears to have come about only because of intense pressure from China on the
MNTJP/MNDAA rather than because of the military’s goodwill. The humanitarian
ceasefire between the army and the Arakan Army (ULA/AA) in November 2022 and
the Haigen Agreement signed by the military and the Three Brotherhood Alliance in
January 2024 were broken within a year.
APHR Fact-Finding Mission
From 28 April to 1 May 2025, an ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
fact-finding mission took place in Mae Sot, Thailand. Traditionally a haven for
displaced Myanmar communities, Mae Sot now hosts overstretched civil society
actors, informal schools and makeshift shelters, which struggle to protect the large
numbers of displaced people and refugees without legal recognition or formal
support.
The mission reveals a worsening humanitarian and political crisis along the Thailand-
Myanmar border, exacerbated by continued military aggression, reduced
humanitarian assistance and regional diplomatic inertia.
APHR calls on ASEAN and its member states to address the challenge with urgency
and determination:
• Thailand must provide legal protection to refugees from Myanmar, including access
to employment, health care, education, protection and humanitarian assistance,
keep the border open and allow refugees safe passage.
• ASEAN must urgently establish a comprehensive humanitarian architecture and
financing by establishing a regional cross-border aid mechanism, with transparent
disbursement and oversight, that bypasses the junta.
• ASEAN must also exert sustained pressure on the Myanmar military and all armed
actors to cease attacks on civilians and the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons
in populated areas. Compliance with international humanitarian law and human
rights obligations – particularly protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure such as
hospitals and schools.
• ASEAN must stop treating the junta as a legitimate stakeholder and instead engage
directly with Myanmar’s democratic forces, ethnic authorities and civil society actors.
The junta’s continued violation of the Five-Point Consensus of ASEAN underscores
the urgent need for a new regional approach – one based on accountability, inclusion
and the protection of civilians.
Yuyun Wahyuningrum, Executive Director of APHR, concluded: “This is no longer
just Thailand’s problem – it is ASEAN’s crisis that must be addressed. The continued
airstrikes, systematic repression and exploitation of humanitarian channels reveal
the junta’s true intentions.” She went on to say: “ASEAN’s inability to act decisively
only reinforces its impunity. The time for vague consensus is over. ASEAN must
reorient itself. It focuses its diplomacy on justice, protecting civilians, and restoring
democracy in Myanmar. Its credibility depends on it.”
China’s strategic calculation
With more than 3.5 million people still homeless as the monsoon season
approaches, aid agencies are warning of the major challenges ahead. The junta of
Min Aung Hlaing is less concerned about this. They are working on a diplomatic
charm offensive towards ASEAN, China and Russia.
Although China and Russia have provided substantial aid since the earthquake,
much of it has been channeled through the junta and is subject to its whims and
minimal transparency.
Min Aung Hlaing and China’s President Xi Jinping met for the first time since the
coup in Moscow on the sidelines of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations of 9 May.
Initially, China’s stance was not always clear. At times, it seemed as if, based on
historically developed ties of friendship, it prioritized the interests of the resistance
over those of the junta. However, based on more recent actions, it seems clear that
there are limits to how far the resistance can go before Beijing draws a line.
Importantly, this is not simply a matter of China siding with the junta or the
resistance. Instead, it reflects a broader strategic calculation.
From Beijing’s perspective, a politically fragmented Myanmar is far more
manageable than a territoriality fragmented country. A weak and divided country—but
still intact—serves China’s long-term interests better, allowing it to exert influence
without the risks of state rupture or regional instability. The ideal situation for Beijing
is a Myanmar that is weak enough to be pliable but intact enough to serve China’s
strategic interests.
A second important implication is the emergence of a “conflict resolution model with
Chinese characteristics” that could become a defining reference point for Myanmar.
For years, western donors and governments have invested heavily in Myanmar’s
peace process—supporting ceasefire monitoring, facilitating dialogue, and
developing institutional mechanisms.
Yet the results have been modest at best, with few lasting outcomes. China, by
contrast, is now developing its model, characterized by assertive mediation and
direct participation in monitoring the ceasefire, as evidenced by its role in the recent
handover in Lashio. If the Lashio process proves effective, it could set a precedent
for how future conflicts in Myanmar are handled – and shaped by Beijing’s strategic
calculations.
Min Aung Hlaing and his cohort must go!
Australian economist Sean Turnell served as “special economic adviser” to NLD
leader Aung San Suu Kyi during the National League for Democracy (NLD) term, an
experience he describes in his recent book “Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of
Reform in Aung San Suu Kyi’s Myanmar.”
He held this position from 2016 until the 2021 coup, after which he was arrested by
the military and spent 650 days in prison before being released in late 2022 and
ordered to leave Myanmar. In a wide-ranging interview with Sebastian Strangio in
The Diplomat, he recounts ambitious efforts to loosen the military’s grip on the
economy, rationalize Myanmar’s institutions, attract foreign investment, and
accelerate catching up with its neighbors.
His hope: “The earthquake and the junta’s vicious and opportunistic response to it
should remind everyone, but especially the international community, that real
improvement in the situation in Myanmar will only come with the removal of Min
Aung Hlaing and his cohort from their positions of power. I believe that will happen.
The junta has run out of money, has run out of ideas. I hope and expect their end will
come sooner rather than later.”
*Jan Servaes (PhD) was UNESCO Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social
Change. He has taught International Communication in Australia, Belgium, China,
Hong Kong, the United States, the Netherlands, and Thailand, in addition to several
teaching and research stints at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is known
for his “multiplicity paradigm” in “Communication for Development. One World,
Multiple Cultures” (1999). He is editor of the 2020 “Handbook on Communication for
Development and Social Change”, and “SDG18. Communication for All” (2 volumes,
2023). [IDN-InDepthNews]
Image: People sleep under a makeshift shelter in Sein Pan district in Mandalay’s
Maha Aung Myay Township, where the 28 March quake destroyed more than 400
homes on 4 April (Credit: Zaw Zaw | Frontier).