Follow-Up On a Cold War Era Lesson
By Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan
The writer is Chairman of Blue Banner NGO, Former Mongolian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
NEW YORK | 4 March 2025 (IDN) — During the Cold war years Mongolia has learned a bitter lesson of the implications of hosting military bases of a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and making itself a legitimate target of other NWSs. With the end of the Cold war, it began to pursue its own vital interests as well as the broader common interests.
When Russia withdrew its bases in 1992, that year Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) and has been working to realize that goal. Nuclear-weapon states (NWSs or the P5) have been reluctant to recognize a single-State NWFZ until it is thoroughly studied and broadly recognized. After some talks in 1998, UNGA adopted a resolution supporting Mongolia’s unique nuclear-weapon-free status[1].
However, to this day the P5 are still reluctant and have not recognized Mongolia as a NWFZ. The reasons given were that as per current definition and concept, NWFZs may be established only by groups of states, i.e. on the basis of arrangements arrived at among the states of the region concerned.[2] The P5 believe that recognizing the right of individual states to establish NWFZs would detract from establishing traditional group-state zones, set unfavorable precedents for their interests and that as a matter of principle the P5 do not provide security assurances to individual states.
Nevertheless, after decades of talks, in 2012 the P5 have adopted a joint declaration by which they have pledged to respect Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it[3]. For Mongolia that was a reassuring development.
From national initiative to a broader concept
The world is rich in its diversity. Mongolia is not the only country that cannot become part of the NWFZ regime. Potentially there are two dozen non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) including land-locked, neutral, island and other states that due to their geographical location or for some valid political or legal reasons, cannot be part of the current NWFZ regime and thus create blind spots and grey areas, i.e. Achilles’ heels in the concept and practice of NWFZs.
Fifty years have passed since the current concept and definition of the NWFZ had been promoted. Meanwhile, time, space and technology have become critical geopolitical factors affecting over-all security and stability. The role of non-committed NNWSs[4] is acquiring increasing importance, both in negative and positive senses.[5] Though it is universally accepted that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, the NNWSs should be mindful of the Latin maxim lupus non mordet lupum (a wolf does not bite a wolf) and make sure that they are not drawn in XXI century great power rivalry.
The reason is that in the rapidly changing security environment nuclear threat is not limited to actual possession of nuclear weapons or hosting of such weapons by some NNWSs. There is also emerging risk of making use of the technical facilities in NNWSs as tools for targeting or in any other way optimizing the use of such weapons. This risk of involving NNWSs must be recognized and effective international verification measures be devised with the active participation of the IAEA or agreed on regional basis.
Naturally, the geographical coverage of NWFZs should be as broad as possible, including the almost 70% of the Earth’s surface that cover vast spaces of seas and oceans where the arms race is increasing. According to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, nearly 15%[6] of that surface constitutes Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)[7] of coastal states that have jurisdiction over the rich living and non-living resources therein.
When exercising the jurisdiction these coastal states are expected to be mindful of the interests of other states. For the sake of common security and stability this spirit of cooperation needs to be actively promoted. Thus 23 Pacific Island States, though with small population, are in fact large ocean states with jurisdiction over vast EEZ resources covering nearly 10 million mi2. Some of them are located on or near strategic trade and military sea lanes and routes.
Geopolitical importance
Hence the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of such areas is increasing.[8] No wonder great power rivalry in this area, especially between the U.S. and China in western Pacific is increasing with many coastal states being showered with great attention. This rivalry needs to be turned into a contest for the benefit of these states as well as regional peace, stability and common prosperity.
In this context a question arises as to what can be done by the NWFZ regime. The practical and pragmatic answer is to make the regime inclusive. However, unlike during the past cold war period the commitments regarding individual state cases should not necessarily be mechanical reproductions of hard commitments but be “smart” ones. Thus, the non-committed NNWSs could adopt national legislations or make individual or a joint statement regarding their commitments beyond the NPT in the spirit of NWFZs.
In turn the P5 could negotiate a code of conduct among themselves as well as with the non-committed NNWSs regarding coastal states’ laws and declarations and provide assurances that they would respect those laws and statements and would not contribute to any act that would violate them. A credible international safeguards and verification mechanism with the support of the IAEA or separate regional arrangements needs to be established that would make the regime truly effective.
UNGA resolution 79/241 on undertaking a second comprehensive study of NWFZs adopted in December 2024 is a timely decision to make the NWS commitments regarding NWFZs clear cut and legally binding, reflecting their original commitments made half a century ago. Reflecting those commitments in their nuclear doctrines and policies would underline the seriousness of their intentions.
The study also needs to clearly underline the importance of making the NWFZ regime inclusive so as to ensure that the non-committed NNWSs would be at the table when the issues of affecting their security and prosperity interests and not on the menu of great powers. Such an approach would contribute to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world for current and future generations. This historic opportunity must not be missed. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Image: Dr Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan
[1] UNGA resolution 53/77 D of 1992.
[2] See UNGA resolution 3472 (XXX) of 1975.
[3] A/67/393-S/2012/721 of 2012.
[4] i.e. NNWSs that are not party to nuclear alliances or traditional group-state NWFZs.
[5] Both in positive and negative senses meaning by serving as indispensable building blocks in establishing the nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW) or risking of being used as pawns in great power rivalry.
[6] Around 30 mln km2
[7] 200 nautical miles beyond territorial seas. The coastal states have right to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage natural resources in the EEZ, manage fisheries, prevent overfishing, establish and use artificial islands, installations, and structure, conduct marine scientific research and protect and preserve the marine environment. The EEZ includes the seabed, subsoil, and waters above it.
[8] According to some studies the demand for living and non-living resources in EEZs might increase up-to five-fold by the middle of this century.
