This article was first published on https://rjaura.substack.com
By Ramesh Jaura
BERLIN | 9 October 2025 (IDN) — Phones rang in Central Asian capitals in mid-August, mere hours after Vladimir Putin finished an unusual three-hour summit with Donald Trump in Anchorage. Putin personally phoned each of the five regional leaders. It was an act of respect for Moscow and Central Asia; it was a reminder that, in the grand drama of international competition, their voices still carry weight.
The Anchorage summit—in flashes of personal competitiveness and awkwardly choreographed cordiality—glimpsed the possibility of global détente. But for Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, content was less important than the message: that discussion, however tenuous, cuts the odds of their neighbourhood getting trashed as collateral damage.
The Western Eye
Ever since the 2022 full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, Western analysis has regarded Central Asia in shallow focus: the enforcement of sanctions. Central Asia is of more interest to Washington and Brussels for logistical reasons than for its identity, and it serves as an essential side road in Moscow’s quest to continue purchasing parts, chips, and products despite embargoes.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, among others, became primary transit points. Western observers followed the trail of European machine parts or Chinese electronics that somehow magically swelled, only to re-emerge in Russia. Officials retaliated with “secondary sanctions”—sanctions for facilitating Russia’s evasion of prohibitions.
But such trade-data focus overlooks the human dimension. For the owner of a Kazakh trucking company, a flight from Orenburg is not a geopolitical move—it’s a matter of survival. For merchants in Bishkek, re-export income keeps tiny enterprises going. Washington’s “sanctions evasion” is often merely a matter of survival economics.
Moscow’s Message
Russia, meanwhile, would rather emphasise reassurance. Commerce continues to flow in volume; millions of Central Asian migrants remit funds back home to Russia, and regional students continue to major in Moscow and St. Petersburg universities, more than in the rest of the world combined.
Moscow’s planned nuclear power projects—their full-sized counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and a small-sized reactor in Kyrgyzstan—are documented not only as power facilities but also as bouquets of common modernisation. An opportunity to serve on a nuclear plant is a professional leap for a young Uzbek engineer, and not just a geopolitical opportunity.
Direct calls from Putin afterwards reassured the message: Central Asia is not an afterthought but an inner circle of partners that matters. With all the fluctuation in alliances, Moscow would like to appear to be the constant that remains dependable.
Pressure Without a Plan
Europe and the United States appear differently. There is no American president who has visited the region since its independence in December 1991. C5+1, long-promised format, is more policy and photo-op than reality. And Trump’s return to the White House in 2025 has thus far produced stricter visa regulations and abrupt reductions in USAID programs—actions perceived as more of a retreat than a rapprochement.
The maths of the trade is harsh: the neighbourhood sells close to seven times more to Russia and more than three times as much to China as to the United States. Washington has been fast with the stick, but slow to provide bread. As an Uzbek diplomat wryly said in private, “America brings us lectures; China brings us railways.”
EU engagement is relatively warmer, particularly on transition and connectivity, but even more restrained compared to Beijing’s cranes or Moscow’s remittances.
Constructing Lines of Steel and Cement
If the West deliberates, China constructs. Between China and Central Asia, the trade reached $95 billion in 2024, and it is expected to continue rising. President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative rolled off the rhetorical runway and onto actual corridors: newer railways from Kashgar across Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan, modernisations along the Trans-Caspian corridor, and multimodal connections westward toward Turkey and Europe.
For inland economies, shipping corridors and iron rails are lifelines. They save time in transport, reduce expenditures, and diminish dependence on one’s immediate neighbour. They are referred to by Western analysts in such euphemistic terms as “sanctions-resilient.” Central Asians term them “sovereignty resilient.”
At the summits in Astana in June 2025, Beijing sweetened the deal with $25 billion in investments and thousands of scholarships for scholars. Where Washington is hesitant, China is forthcoming.
Paper Tigers and Sharp Tongues
Anchorage also created a memorable quote that spread worldwide. When Trump called Russia a “paper tiger,” Putin’s response was immediate: if Russia is paper, he added, NATO’s own paper must be thinner yet, for all it did do was shatter Moscow’s will. Spoken in his characteristic half-smile, half-growl, the phrase was crafted for headlines.
In Western capitals, it was read as swagger. In Central Asia, it played off in another key. Here, leaders gauge partners more by endurance than by words. If Russia can weather sanctions, maintain remittances, and yet vow new projects in energy, then maybe it is less vulnerable than sceptics argue.
Forum of Putin’s Ideas
Every autumn, Sochi, the Black Sea resort town more famous for sun-dappled boardwalks than geopolitics, is home to the Valdai Discussion Club meetings. But for twenty years, Moscow has used the Valdai platform to present its foreign policy.
Putin’s speeches here may drone on for hours, alternating between grievance and grand strategy. Setting is intentional: a handpicked audience of scholars, press, and officials, streamed live worldwide. Ideational buzzwords such as “multipolarity” and “civilisational states” first emerged in Valdai and went on to regular use in Moscow’s diplomatic lexicon.
For Central Asia, the Valdai is not static noise. When Putin mentions Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan in his statement, it is taken as signalling. When he mocks paper tigers, it is heard more as reassurance—that Moscow’s imperium will survive. Sochi is an annual forecast for the region’s leaders, signalling in which directions Moscow’s winds will blow.
Choices Under Constraint
Nevertheless, the region is more than inactive. Kazakhstan is expanding its role as a mediator, acting as a connector between Russia, China, and the West. Uzbekistan drives industrialisation, seeking to minimise dependence on a single partner. Kyrgyzstan reaps the benefits of re-export gains but fears being blacklisted. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan rely heavily on remittances, but they are also seeking Chinese loans. Turkmenistan drives its idiosyncratic energy diplomacy.
For average people, these decisions aren’t abstractions. A Kyrgyz family from Osh relies on money transferred from Moscow each month. An Almaty student decides whether to learn in Moscow, Beijing, or Berlin. A Tashkent factory manager determines whether new equipment will be shipped through Russia, Europe, or China. These are human bets below the layers of policy.
Bargaining, Not Back
Has Anchorage reshaped the world chessboard? Doubt it. However, for Central Asia, it provided a much-needed respite. Kazakhstan described it as its launchpad for peace talks. Moscow employed it to demonstrate that it continues to consult partners. Washington exhibited enthusiasm for enforcement but lacked strategic insight. And Beijing persevered, building its rails in silence while others brawled.
The test took place on 2 October, when President Putin spoke at the Valdai forum, praising new multilateral frameworks such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and Eurasian organisations—all of which include Central Asian states. Putin described these as non-hierarchical alliances built on “agreement, not domination,” signalling that Russia views its regional partnerships, including with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and others, as part of this cooperative vision.
Central Asia is nobody’s backyard. It is a Negotiating Place where Russia reassures, the West polices, China constructs, and regional leaders hedge. Putin’s “paper tiger” swipe was directed at Trump, but it was reserved for Astana, Tashkent, and Bishkek—a warning that Russia is beaten but not broken. Ultimately, the region is more concerned with leaders’ actions than with their language. Will remittances continue flowing to Tajik families? Will Tajikistani factories whir with foreign equipment? Will Kazakh students seize the opportunity in or outside their motherland? Its survival tactic for now is not loyalty but agility—and in an age of cruising superpowers, that could yet prove its greatest asset.
About the author: Ramesh Jaura is a journalist with 60 years of experience as a freelancer, head of Inter Press Service, and founder-editor of IDN-InDepthNews. His work draws on field reporting and coverage of international conferences and events. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Original link: https://rjaura.substack.com/p/central-asia-at-the-crossroads
Related link: https://www.eurasiareview.com/06102025-central-asia-at-the-crossroads-oped/