By Kester Kenn Klomegah*
MOSCOW | 10 June 2025 (IDN) — With its Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan (2023-2026), approved as a working document by the Kremlin, Russia faces a long and winding road, especially in implementing several bilateral agreements signed with African countries.
While manoeuvring around challenges and obstacles within Africa, Russia has still not established a concrete financial budget for development projects, and the stark reality is that Russia’s financial institutions are unprepared to invest capital in Africa, reflecting comparatively low dynamics in resetting its economic influence across the continent. Noticeably, Russia’s economic presence has, therefore, lagged far behind its geopolitical rhetorics and propaganda.
On 4 June, under the chairmanship of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, a meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation was held on the topic “Furthering Russia’s cooperation with Africa.” While the meeting underscored the priority status of comprehensive relations with the African continent in line with the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the President in 2023, it also reminded preparations for the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, scheduled to take place this year in an African state, which will serve as a key milestone ahead of the third Russia-Africa Summit in 2026. As expected, Russia is required to report its concrete achievements and outline another broad economic agenda for 2026-2029.
After two historic Russia-Africa summits, several conferences, and bilateral meetings aimed at moving Russia’s relations from stagnation to growth, from a low-level to a higher stage within the context of geopolitical competition and rivalry, have encountered institutional obstacles, including political bureaucracy and a lack of prioritisation in implementing official policies. Russia’s decision to exit the investment landscape can largely be attributed to African leaders’ inability to create a favourable climate and their unpreparedness to change rules and regulations for foreign corporate businesses to operate in Africa.
Trailing behind Action Plan Agenda 2023-26
Despite its tectonic desire to raise investment in energy and food security, infrastructure, and industrial projects, Russia has still lagged in implementing its Action Plan Agenda 2023-26, approved during the St. Petersburg summit. Policy researchers and experts have also emphasised the empirical fact that African leaders bear some responsibility for Russian businesses leaving Africa. During the previous years of exploring Russia’s economic presence and its long-term implications, the findings have been both fantastic and mixed, while at times presenting some interesting complications and contradictions.
At least, since the first Russia-Africa summit held in 2019, Russia has significantly reset its focus on investing in Africa’s economy and engaged in appreciably resonating public relations. The loudest was the planned construction of nuclear energy plants in West Africa, specifically in Burkina Faso and South Africa. Now, African leaders, policymakers, business leaders, and investors have begun rethinking alternative, dynamic development models within the context of the changing global economy.
There are many contributing factors to the policy mindset. Moreover, African leaders are establishing hidden leverages and adopting a new psychology towards success that is connected to economic development in the continent. A few studies have shown that the entrepreneurial attitudes of African business directors have changed over the past few decades, despite geopolitical challenges, by shifting from reactive to proactive positions to improve the bilateral situation with Europe and the United States.
The leaders are more concerned about growing demographics, rising youth unemployment, and the social standing of the population. Across Africa, 50-60% of the population is below the age of 25, according to United Nations reports. Leaders are also concerned about their political campaign promises and economic manifestos delivered to the respective electorates, and consequently, rhetoric and popular slogans such as ‘international solidarity and friendship’ are now considered geopolitical tools of the past. Understandably, these are the stark realities of the present times.
Far-reaching implications, particularly for Russia
The emerging trends mentioned above have far-reaching implications, particularly for Russia. Under these circumstances, it could still develop integrated strategies for re-asserting visible economic influence in Africa, but a few reports below equally have some negative connotations. In late May 2025, Russian media outlet Interfax reported, quoting the press service of Russian state bank VTB, that the shareholders of Banco VTB Africa had voted at a general meeting to approve a decision to liquidate the bank. “Work is now being done with the regulator (the National Bank of Angola) to make the relevant decisions on the arrangements for working on the liquidation under the legislation of the Republic of Angola,” VTB said.
It was widely anticipated, as VTB’s first deputy CEO, Dmitry Pyanov, initially stated in February, that the Angolan subsidiary’s license would be terminated by the end of this summer. The report explicitly states that VTB previously owned 50.1% of Banco VTB Africa, while the President of the Angolan state company Endiama, Antonio Carlos Sumbula, owned the remaining 49.9%.
It is worth noting here that VTB focuses on work in Russia and in countries with which there is a large volume of foreign trade, above all China, trade with which reached US$290 billion in 2022. In early March, Russia’s VTB head, Andrei Kostin, also said in an interview with the French newspaper Les Echos that the VTB would sell its subsidiary bank in Angola due to sanctions. VTB was one of the first banks to be added to the United States and European Union (EU) sanctions lists, which significantly impacted the bank’s international business following the launch of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.
Similarly, there is also the historical fact that Russia made a significant contribution to South Africa’s political struggle until it attained independence. The outlook for bilateral relations is excellent, as both are staunch members of the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). However, Russia’s low level of economic investment is noticeable. By comparison, Russia accounts for a paltry 2% of South Africa’s trade. In contrast, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union account for a combined 35%, with China accounting for approximately 9%. The energy deficit has crippled industrial operations, often described as unjustifiable and unacceptable, as South Africa waves its baton, signalling power, on the international stage, but is currently experiencing the worst economic crisis in its history. South Africa and Russia have recently drawn criticism, with the fundamental question being why Russia has failed so badly with the planned construction of nuclear power plants under former President Jacob Zuma.
Mark-Anthony Johnson noted in his opinion article, published in the Business and Financial Times in early August 2023, that “South Africa risks becoming bankrupt for its relationship with Russia, which adds virtually nothing to the economy, state revenues, economic growth, job creation, socioeconomic stability and investor sentiment.” South Africa has been hit with problems ranging from energy deficits, collapsing industrial production and rising tensions among the large labour force.
Unfulfilled pledges
Despite consistent assurances made by high-ranking Russian officials that Africa is “in the mainstream of Russia’s foreign policy,” these have not been substantiated by systematic, practical activities. Worse still, a severe lack of state support for sustaining effective Russia-African economic ties has necessitated the withdrawal of several Russian companies from Africa.
Undoubtedly, several Russian companies have underperformed, mainly in Africa, which experts attribute to multiple reasons. Most often, Russian investors target significant investment niches that still require long-term strategies and thorough country analysis. Grappling with reality, there are numerous investment challenges, including bureaucratic hurdles in Africa.
To ensure business safety and consequently achieve target goals, it is necessary to gain a level of understanding of the country’s priorities and investment legislation, comply with the terms of agreements, and conduct a careful study of policy changes, particularly when there are sudden changes in government. It is essential to examine the African market structure, investment climate, capabilities of potential business partners, and the characteristics of African customers.
In an analytical study, it is clear that Asian states, Europe and the United States often refer to Africa as the continent of the 21st century. Furthermore, a more general analysis reveals that Russian corporations have also shown interest in investing in the region. In practical terms, among those corporate companies that managed to make inroads, a few have already exited, citing “technical and operational” reasons. At the same time, the business leaders demonstrated a negative attitude towards Africa.
Several reports further confirmed that Russia had abandoned its lucrative platinum project contract, which was signed for US$3 billion in September 2014, located in the sun-scorched area about 50 km northwest of Harare, the Zimbabwean capital. Reasons for the abrupt termination of the bilateral contract have not been made public. Still, Zimbabwe’s Centre for Natural Resource Governance pointed to a lack of capital (the source of finance) for the project.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov launched the US$3 billion Russian project in 2014, following years of negotiations, with the intention of enhancing its economic profile in Zimbabwe. The development of the platinum deposit in Darwendale involves a consortium comprising the Rostekhnologii State Corporation, Vneshekonombank, and Vi Holding in a joint venture with private Zimbabwean investors and the Zimbabwean government.
Lied to Russia
According to Bloomberg, the Darwendale has been tied to Russia since 2006, when former Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe took the concession from a local unit of South Africa’s Impala Platinum Holdings and handed it over to Russian investors. The first venture to attempt to tap the deposit was named Ruschrome Mining – it included a state-owned mining company, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, the Russian defence conglomerate Rostec, Vnesheconombank, and Vi Holding.
The Darwendale project was not tendered, according to available information from official government website sources monitored both in Russia and Zimbabwe. With its cordial relations, Russia was simply offered the lucrative mining concession without having to participate in any tender. After the project launch, Brigadier General Mike Nicholas Sango, Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation, told me in an email that “Russia’s biggest economic commitment to Zimbabwe to date was its agreement in September 2014 to invest US$3 billion in what is Zimbabwe’s largest platinum mine”.
“What will set this investment apart from those that have been in Zimbabwe for decades is that the project will see the installation of a refinery to add value, thereby creating more employment and secondary industries. We are confident that this marks the beginning of a renewed Russian-Zimbabwean economic partnership that will flourish in the years to come. The two countries are discussing other mining deals in addition to energy, agriculture, manufacturing and industrial projects,” Ambassador Sango added.
President Emmerson Mnangagwa said his government would soon open up the platinum sector to all interested foreign investors.
Zimbabwe has the world’s second-largest platinum reserves after South Africa. With the rapid geopolitical changes, Mnangagwa has been committed to opening up Zimbabwe’s economy to the rest of the world to attract much-needed foreign direct investment, revive the ailing economy, and capitalise on opportunities for implementing several large projects in the country. That Zimbabwe would undergo a “painful” reform process to achieve transformation and modernisation of the economy.
Zimbabwe has various sectors besides mining. There is a possibility of greater participation by Russian economic actors in the development processes in Zimbabwe and throughout southern Africa. Most often, officials speak about Russia, claiming that Zimbabwe has had good and time-tested relations from Soviet days. Diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Russia have already marked their 40th year, and yet there is not a single industrial facility to boast of in that country. Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Before holding the first Russia-Africa summit, Norilsk Nickel terminated its deal with Botswana’s BCL Group. According to TASS News Agency, quoting the company’s media release in December 2018, Norilsk Nickel terminated its agreement to sell African assets to Botswana’s BCL Group, including a 50% stake in the Nkomati joint venture.
It said that the Russian company would seek damages from the BCL Group for the losses it suffered due to BCL’s failure to meet the terms of the agreement. The termination of the contract would also enable Norilsk Nickel to pursue its strategy for the African assets, Michael Marriott, Chief Executive of Norilsk Nickel Africa, said, as quoted by the press service.
In the East African region, Russia’s RT-Global Resources and Rosneft withdrew from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s oil refinery project and several major infrastructure deals. Russia had pledged US$4 billion, but later disagreements over terms and frustration over in-fighting, intrigue and lobbying forced them to pull out of the country. The Ugandan government team noted that the Russian consortium exhibited inadequate assurance and availability of preferred alternative foreign contractors with comparatively high bidding terms.
Museveni initially favoured the Russians because, apart from considering access to weapons, the Ugandan leadership was also counting on Russia’s global superiority as a counterweight to both Western powers, mainly the United States and China. With Russians and the South Koreans out of the negotiations, Uganda appeared somewhat desperate. That was back in 2014.
Similarly, it is worth noting that Rosneft also abandoned its interest in the southern Africa oil pipeline construction soon after its delegation in Angola had discussed the possible participation of the Kremlin-controlled company in exploration and development projects there. That project never appeared despite Russia’s excellent relations with Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. From a business and political perspective, the region is considered a unique regional power combined with South Africa.
In addition, Lukoil, one of Russia’s biggest oil companies, like many Russian companies, has had a long history of shifting its business intentions forward and backwards, with declarations of plans to tap into oil and gas resources in Africa. Besides technical and geographical challenges, Lukoil explicitly noted in an official report on its website that “the African leadership and government policies always pose serious problems to operations in the region.” It stated that the company has been committed to strictly observing its obligations as a foreign investor in Africa.
Lukoil withdrew from the oil and gas exploration and drilling project it initiated in Sierra Leone. According to Interfax, the local Russian news agency, the company does not currently have any projects and has backed away due to poor exploration results in Sierra Leone. It was reported that drilling in West Africa, including in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, did not yield the expected results for Lukoil, as preliminary technical results did not demonstrate commercial hydrocarbon reserves. Vice-President Leonid Fedun ruled that Lukoil would withdraw completely from almost all projects in West Africa.
Russia’s corporate interest in exploring Africa’s oil and gas
In the context of geopolitical changes, Russia’s corporate interest in exploring Africa’s oil and gas has consistently risen beyond its practical action. Understandably, while Russia claims the world’s leading position as an exporter of oil resources, it has also expressed a desire to cooperate with potential African producers. Energy experts and analysts have explained that Russia would only ‘gatekeep’ African producers from entering the oil market. Russia exports crude oil and other oil-related products to several African countries, earning revenue for its state budget.
Under the aegis of resetting its bilateral economic relations with Nigeria, Russia has declared its intention to revamp the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Complex, which was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Russia aims to take up energy, oil, and gas projects, as well as facilitate bilateral trade. Nigeria is one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies, and it has the largest population. It is currently estimated that there are 220 million people, representing a significant market potential for prospective foreign investors and presenting numerous investment opportunities.
Foreign Minister Lavrov held a review meeting with his Nigerian counterpart, Minister Chief Ojo Mbila Maduekwe and emphatically noted that Moscow was prepared to offer trade preferences to Nigeria. Then, Vice President Kashim Shettima headed the Nigerian delegation to attend that second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg. Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar was among the group. Following that, Maitama Tuggar again held talks in March 2024 at the Foreign Ministry.
However, it conclusively showed that Russia had failed to grant the ‘trade preference’ it had promised during several Russian-Nigerian bilateral meetings on Smolenskiy Plochad. Until today, Russia, as a reliable partner, has never honoured its promise of extending trade preferences, in practical terms, to Nigeria. Extending trade preferences was interpreted as an integral part of strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
As is well known, Russia has been pursuing its nuclear power ambitions over the years.
According to Russia, Rosatom signed a protocol on nuclear that offered the possibility of bilateral cooperation for the development of nuclear infrastructure and the joint exploration and exploitation of uranium deposits. It was not considered a charity. Nigeria is also an economic powerhouse in West African region. The primary aim of two nuclear plants, estimated to cost US$20 billion – the bulk of which is being funded by Russia – is to boost Nigeria’s electricity supply.
In addition, Russia’s second-largest oil company, privately controlled Lukoil, as always, planned to expand its operations in Nigeria and several West African countries. Until the writing of this article, there has been a period of silence following Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, signing an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) on the exploration and exploitation of gas reserves through a new joint venture company, NiGaz Energy Company. Nigeria needs Russian technology to boost industrialisation, just as Russia needs Nigeria as a market for its industrial products and various types of military equipment and weaponry. There is an explicit indication the two countries have an adequate perception of each other, but both grossly lack the required political will to implement existing bilateral agreements.
Over the years, Russian trade experts and business consultants have discussed ways to enhance economic cooperation with Africa. One analytical report indicated that several prominent Russian companies operating in Africa had established themselves negatively in African countries. This is primarily due to ignorance of the region’s cultural peculiarities, a lack of social responsibility, and failure to fulfil contractual obligations fully. These cases damage the image of Russia and Russian companies entering the African market.
Russia’s image tarnished in Africa’s business landscape
All these developments, to some extent, have tarnished Russia’s image in Africa’s business landscape. In December 2018, a year before the first African leaders’ gathering in Sochi, the Valdai Discussion Club hosted an expert discussion on Africa. Oleg Barabanov, Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, highlighted the investment prospects and their influence by foreign players and further analysed perspectives and challenges for potential Russian investors.
In her contribution, Nataliya Zaiser, Chairperson of the Board of the African Business Initiative (ABI) – a Moscow-based business NGO – stressed that economic cooperation with African countries is not only an initiative but also a response to requests from African partners. Despite this mutual bilateral interest and potentially fruitful projects, Nataliya Zaiser said that there were still only a few successful Russian business cases on the continent.
Andrei Maslov, Coordinator of the work/project on the Russia-Africa Shared Vision 2030 report, Integration Expertise Analytical Centre, explained that, in comparison with the situation a decade ago, Africa is not only the main initiator of dialogue with Russia, but it is also much more ready for it. Earlier, the economic landscape of the continent was dominated by Western companies with their colonial approaches. Now, Africa is poised to become an equal partner, according to the Valdai report.
However, there are problems: Maslov echoed Nataliya Zaiser by saying that about 90% of the projects fail. To overcome this discord, the state’s coordinating role is necessary, which, in conjunction with private businesses, should develop a clear roadmap and set targets for the growth of various industries. According to Maslov, the driver of economic cooperation can be private initiatives rather than top-down state initiatives.
“For us, Africa is not a terra incognita: the USSR actively worked there, having diplomatic relations with 35 countries. Generally, there are no turns, reversals, or zigzags in our policy. There is a consistent development of relations with African countries,” according to Oleg Ozerov from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Signing bilateral agreements is not the ultimate guarantee of investment success, but it does provide a legal basis. As the situation develops and interest continues to rise, Russian investors must allocate part of their financial budget for private consultancy services, as many foreign players do, and be prepared to learn more about the culture of investing in Africa.
Partnerships continue to face challenges
According to expert policy narratives, Russian-African economic cooperation and partnerships continue to face challenges and obstacles, including inadequate knowledge of Africa’s investment landscape and a lack of appreciable state support. Meanwhile, Moscow appears to be increasingly prioritising anti-Western rhetoric and political confrontation in the context of the great power competition in Africa. African leaders tend to prefer neutral positions and act strategically in balancing ways.
In this final summary, thorough research indicates that Russian companies have been exiting Africa primarily due to geopolitical shifts, economic challenges, and a changing investment climate. This trend must be drastically reversed and instead invigorated to foster multifaceted relations. In practical terms, Russia’s decision would be in the right direction in connection with allocating financial resources for specific projects by establishing a Development Fund under the African Partnership Department at Russia’s Foreign Ministry. This ultimate step offers the possibility of gaining the status of a recognisable key player on the continent. In this case, Russia’s investment partnerships and its dominating economic collaborations would become more visible in future across Africa.
*Kester Kenn Klomegah has diverse work experience in the field of policy research and business consultancy. His focused interests include geopolitical changes, foreign relations, and economic development-related questions in Africa, particularly concerning key global powers. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Image: Russia-Africa Summit on 10 November 2024. Credit: Foreign Affairs Ministry.
