By Tariq Rauf*
VIENNA | 9 September 2024 (IDN) — The Board of Governors (Board) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is holding its third regular meeting of the year during the week of 9 to 13 September 2024. Increasingly, astute observers are wondering whether the IAEA Board is up to the job mandated for it in the Statute of the Agency, given rampant politicization, factionalism and lack of technical focus?
Fractious divisions persist in the Board on important nuclear safeguards, safety and security matters, including inter alia Iran, Syria, North Korea, attacks on nuclear facilities, and naval nuclear propulsion.
Board of Governors: Fraying of “Gemütlichkeit”
The IAEA (Agency) website informs that the Board is one of the two policy-making organs of the Agency, along with the annual General Conference of the 178 IAEA Member States.
The Board examines the Agency’s financial statements, and approves inter alia its programme and budget, applications for membership, safeguards agreements, security and safety standards, and appoints the Director General of the IAEA with the concurrence of the General Conference.
The Board is mandated to meet five times per year in regular sessions: in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in November, and may meet in extraordinary or special sessions when requested by one or more Member States, or to deal with urgent safeguards, safety or security matters at the request of the Director General.
The IAEA was established in Vienna (Austria) in 1957 as an autonomous self-governing technical international organization dealing with matters concerning atomic energy. The “objectives” of the Agency are defined in the Statute, “The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”.
The 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (INFCIRC/140) breathed life in the Agency’s then struggling verification mission through the implementation of safeguards covering all nuclear activities in 182 out of the current 186 non-nuclear weapon States Parties.
The IAEA is not a party to the NPT and has no mandate or role to interpret NPT provisions except for Article III of the Treaty which covers safeguards (verification).
The legal frameworks of Agency safeguards are independent of whether or not a State is a member of the Agency, but are related to the State’s international legal treaty obligations, or voluntary actions, subject to IAEA verification.
Over the years NPT States Parties inter alia have reaffirmed that the IAEA continues to be recognized, and has demonstrated, as serving as the sole competent independent technical international authority responsible for nuclear safeguards, safety, security, and applications; in particular to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties in fulfilment of their obligations in connection with the NPT, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties; and nothing should be done to undermine the authority and independence of the Agency in this regard.
I was recruited in March 2002 by then IAEA Director General as Head of Verification and Security Policy in his office. By that time politicization of the Board had been well underway over the technical aspects of the Iraq nuclear file and implementation of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the denuclearization of Iraq after the first Gulf War, and subsequent resolutions including UNSCR 1441 (2002) preceding the March 2003 illegal invasion of Iraq, though there had been elements of politicization over certain other political matters during previous years, especially concerning the Middle East and Israel’s nuclear capabilities.
The politicization took a turn for the worse inter alia with the opening of the Iran nuclear file in August 2002 in connection with undeclared uranium enrichment activities in contradiction with its comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/172) pursuant to its adherence to the NPT (INFCIRC/140).
Another separate matter in 2005 was enhanced civil nuclear cooperation with a State not a party to the NPT and subject to UN Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) on immediately halting its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes.
Since then the politicization and loss of technical focus in the Board continued to increase over the years, on safeguards implementation matters concerning North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Korea, and Syria.
Other politicized matters concerned nuclear security (security of nuclear and radioactive materials), strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards including integrated safeguards and State Level Approach, naval nuclear propulsion, and attacks on nuclear facilities among other issues.
Given this rather lengthy but necessary introduction, let us revert to the fundamental question of whether the IAEA Board is up to the job it has been mandated by the Agency’s Statute?
Most unfortunately it seems that at times it no longer is! The Board seems more and more descending into being a gaggle of 35 Member States engaging in arguments sometimes bordering on diatribes driven by factional divisions reflecting the deteriorating international security situation and the emerging systemic conflicts involving the US/EU and allies, Russia and China, among other divisions.
Most Member States’ Governors and Resident Representatives generally are from foreign ministries thus at times bringing in external biases and conflicts unrelated to the basic objectives of the IAEA as a technical international organization addressing the field of nuclear energy. In this regard, more and more, they seem to be willing prisoners of disconnected policymakers in capitals and seem unaccountable to taxpayers who fund assessed budgetary contributions to the Agency as well as their salaries and representational expenses.
Add to the mix the periodic undue influence and pressure exerted by certain powerful Member States on the Agency’s Director General and Secretariat staff especially on high profile safeguards matters listed above, as well as on various other substantive issues related to safeguards, safety and security. At times this even can degenerate to ad hominem attacks and character disparagement of the Director General and staff members perceived to be preserving the independence of the Agency and resisting the political interests of powerful Member States and at times also of their dependent allied States.
Any such actions are in clear violation of the independence, integrity and authority of the Director General and Secretariat staff, as well as of the principles of the independence and impartiality of the Agency’s Statute, the Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) adopted by the General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members (19 July 2016), and should be resisted and condemned by the Agency’s Member States.
The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times by 2005 Nobel Peace Prize winner former Director General Mohamed ElBaradei should be required reading for diplomats accredited to the Agency—the premier international organization in Vienna.
Even Member States are not immune to pressure on important matters from certain powerful States. One Chair of the Board was recalled and dismissed from service under severe external pressure on their capital as their delegation abstained on an important case-specific safeguards resolution instead of voting in the affirmative. In another instance, a draft non-compliance resolution concerning a nuclear-dependent State for undeclared nuclear activities was squelched under pressure.
When a safeguards agreement for a non-NPT State benefiting from enhanced civil nuclear cooperation at par or better than for non-nuclear-weapon States was up for “approval” before the Board, several ambassadors on the Board faced career ending threats if they did not vote in favour—I know of this personally as several beat a sorry path to my office at the Agency hoping to get a sympathetic ear. I fear that such pressure tactics might be employed when safeguards arrangements on naval nuclear propulsion developed in secrecy might be brought before the Board for “appropriate action”—hopefully not!
As I stated at a briefing for IAEA Member States in May this year, I continue to have full confidence in and support the efforts of the current Director General and IAEA Secretariat Staff in upholding the authority, integrity, independence and professionalism of the Secretariat in fulfilling its Statutory and international legal obligations while rejecting any undue influence from external sources.
It should be understood and make no mistake that my commentary and questions on various aspects of the Board’s activities concerning nuclear safeguards, safety and security activities, as a former IAEA official, is motivated by supporting the organization’s efforts and to suggest information, ways and modalities to further enhance the IAEA’s performance on contentious and complex matters, free from pressures from various external sources.
And, further, in this regard, to encourage a return to Member States of the intangible “spirit of Vienna” that encourages harmony and compromise: “Gemütlichkeit”.
In my opinion the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded to the IAEA for its continuing efforts to secure nuclear facilities in conflict areas, promotion of nuclear applications for energy, health, agriculture, zoonotics, water and development, as well ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing its misuse for nuclear explosive devices. That would be fitting recognition two decades on from when the Agency was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for efforts “to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way”.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Leaving aside the other contentious matters before the Board referred to above, the matter of addressing safeguards in connection with naval nuclear propulsion has been vexing the Board for nearly three years, the divisions are widening, and the Secretariat appears nowhere near resolving important outstanding technical questions and concerns.
This matter of naval nuclear propulsion and safeguards also has been fought over in the review process of the NPT—at the 10th review conference in 2022, and in preparatory committee sessions in 2023 and 2024.
Thus, the controversy continues unabated. The non-nuclear-weapon NPT States pursuing nuclear submarine acquisition programmes determinedly insist on keeping all substantive interactions with the Secretariat between the concerned parties and only at the finalization of arrangements or special procedures to bring them before the Board for “appropriate action”.
In contrast, many of those States that either oppose or are concerned by these nuclear activities insist on discussing this matter in an open-ended process involving all interested Member States to reach an agreed solution to be put before the Board for its “approval”.
For my part, I am not a newcomer to this complex matter and have been seized of this matter since 1987 when Canada was the first non-nuclear-weapon NPT State party to decide to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered conventionally armed submarines, and to trigger the “loophole” in the standard comprehensive safeguards agreement to keep the nuclear fuel out of mandatory safeguards. See, Opening Pandora’s Box: Nuclear Powered Submarines and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Aurora Papers 8 (1988).
In addition, some my other analyses on this matter can be found in IAEA INFCIRC/1213 (29 May 2024), INCIRC/1091 (1 June 2023), Nuclear Submarines and The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Brazil Gets a Jump on Australia? (8 August 2022), Crashing Nuclear Submarines Through IAEA Safeguards (June 2022), and Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines Will Risk Opening a Pandora’s Box of Proliferation (19 September 2021).
The IAEA Secretariat’s views are noted in various statements by the Director General and in INFCIRC/1213 (29 May 2024), Naval nuclear propulsion: Australia (31 May 2023), and IAEA safeguards in relation to AUKUS (9 September 2022).
The views of the main protagonists in the Board can be found inter alia in working papers of the NPT review process: NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/WP.36 (China), NPT/CONF.2020/WP.66 (Australia, UK, USA), NPT/CONF.2020/WP.71 (Brazil); in a FACT SHEET: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines (13 March 2023) and Non-paper on Nuclear Propulsion Cooperation Under AUKUS (November 2021), and in IAEA INFCIRC/1213 (29 May 2024), INCIRC/1091 (1 June 2023).
NPT PrepCom Geneva (2024)
At this year’s session of the NPT PrepCom in Geneva, two side-events were convened addressing naval nuclear propulsion in which several interesting points were raised: Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Nuclear Naval Propulsion Development co-sponsored by Indonesia and UNIDIR on 25 July 2024, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Non-Proliferation: Update co-sponsored by Australia, UK, and USA on 26 July.
At its side-event on 25 July, my notes at the event indicate that Indonesia inter alia stated to the effect that, “…the Indonesian government decided to organize this event. We hope it will provide an open, transparent avenue for dialogue on the development of naval nuclear propulsion, with the objective of contributing to the strengthening of the safeguards and non-proliferation regime and ensuring adaptability in responding to emerging issues such as naval nuclear propulsion. We are fully aware that deliberation on this issue has been ongoing in Vienna, and Indonesia is closely following the discussion. We continuously recognize the IAEA as the sole competent authority on the safeguards regime. We also believe that open and inclusive discussion within the NPT process will strengthen existing safeguards and ensure the NPT’s adaptability in responding to emerging issues”.
My notes indicate that Australia inter alia stated to the effect that, “Australia and the IAEA are working together to develop a robust safeguards and verification approach for our naval nuclear propulsion programme…. Australia is committed to developing a robust safeguards and verification approach that ensures the IAEA will continue to meet its technical objectives: verifying no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activity anywhere in Australia. We aim to set the highest non-proliferation standard for other States that might also seek to acquire naval nuclear propulsion capability. Under our Article 14 arrangement, the Agency will maintain oversight of all nuclear material…. Technical considerations in developing a non-proliferation approach must be tailored to the specific programme concerned. A one-size-fits-all approach is not feasible given State-specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programmes…. The IAEA has the necessary experience to develop arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the statutes and relevant safeguards agreements” [emphasis added].
At the same side-event, my notes indicate that Brazil inter alia stated to the effect that, “In Brazil’s view, naval nuclear propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy. In Brazil’s view, there is no need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards if the IAEA can fulfill its verification mandate with the current safeguards provisions. I also agree with my colleague from Australia that there should not be a “one-size-fits-all” arrangement for naval nuclear propulsion” [emphasis added].
At the side-event on 26 July co-sponsored by Australia, UK, USA, my notes at the event indicate that the United Kingdom inter alia stated to the effect that, “It’s been the longstanding practice of the IAEA to negotiate directly and bilaterally with Member States on their safeguards and verification arrangements. Therefore, Australia’s negotiations on its Article 14 arrangement and its own comprehensive safeguards agreement should follow this practice. There is no basis for involving another State in that negotiation, as such an approach would likely lead to the politicization of the process…. While we intend to set the highest non-proliferation standards, we do not intend to create or impose a template arrangement for other States”.
At the same side-event, my notes indicate that the United States inter alia stated to the effect that, “…Article 14 is not a loophole and its purpose is clear. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and discussed at great length during the negotiations to develop the model comprehensive safeguards agreement…. Some Member States have claimed a tradition or principle that all new safeguards approaches have been developed through a consensus approach by the Board of Governors and that such precedent requires an intergovernmental process. Firstly, this claim is false…. five key principles by which the United States plans to evaluate any arrangements for naval nuclear propulsion via non-nuclear-weapon States, including those related to AUKUS:
- Can the IAEA meet all of its safeguards technical objectives throughout the naval nuclear programme lifecycle with the tools and authorities available under that arrangement?
- Does the country have a strong and consistent track record of non-proliferation and compliance with IAEA safeguards?
- Has the country engaged with IAEA Secretariat, the Board of Governors, and members in a timely manner throughout its naval nuclear propulsion process?
- Is the mechanism for the verification arrangement appropriately derived from the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement?
- Has the country provided the IAEA with the types of additional information and access granted under the Additional Protocol?” [emphasis added].
Reality Check
Now, all of these above-quoted statements undoubtedly were made in good faith, however, inadvertently some do contain certain misunderstandings of fact and practice. I shall endeavour to comment on some of the assertions made in these two side-events:
We aim to set the highest non-proliferation standard for other States that might also seek to acquire naval nuclear propulsion capability.
The three AUKUS States generously but presumptuously, some might venture to say even arrogantly, have taken unto themselves the mandate and authority to “set the highest non-proliferation standard for other States”, but there is no legal precedent or practice at the Agency for specific States to interpret and set safeguards standards for other States in relation to the Agency’s safeguards system especially when this concerns NPT comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153).
The Agency will maintain oversight of all nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion.
It is commendable that a commitment is being made that all nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion will remain under the Agency’s safeguards oversight, even though the Article I4 “loophole” provides for a State to only provide information to the Agency on the isotopic composition and total quantity of nuclear material under non-application of safeguards in non-proscribed military activity understood to mean naval nuclear propulsion. Thus, can this commitment be taken to mean that the nuclear fuel for naval nuclear propulsion will remain under full-scope Agency safeguards?
Technical considerations in developing a non-proliferation approach must be tailored to the specific naval nuclear propulsion programme concerned. A one-size-fits-all approach is not feasible given State-specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programmes.
This assertion is partially correct, but in order to determine and implement a standard interpretation and practice of the standard comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) it is essential to develop a common understanding of the procedures to be implemented. Therefore, it is essential that interested Member States in a technically-based open-ended discussion develop a uniform and common understanding of the procedures to be implemented under Article 14 of INFCIRC/153 on non-application of safeguards on non-proscribed military activities understood to imply naval nuclear propulsion, as the principles and technology of naval nuclear reactors is the same irrespective of the type of fuel used—low-enriched or highly-enriched uranium.
All NPT non-nuclear-weapon States sign and ratify the standard INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement, but then conclude subsidiary arrangements and related facility attachment procedures. Hence, under a standard framework on Article 14 procedures, individual States can conclude with the Agency subsidiary arrangements and facility attachments for their specific types of nuclear-powered submarines.
[See, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2022, 1.30. Subsidiary arrangements (p.14): Safeguards agreements based on [INFCIRC/153] require the conclusion of subsidiary arrangements that include attachments for facilities and material balance areas (MBAs) outside facilities (facility/location outside facilities (LOF) attachments), which detail the safeguards procedures for each individual facility/location outside facilities (LOF)].
The IAEA has the necessary experience to develop arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the statutes and relevant safeguards agreements.
The only experience the IAEA Secretariat has with regard to Article 14 of INFCIRC/153 concerns Canada, but no arrangements were finalized or brought before the Board. In reality, the Secretariat lacks the required experience on non-application of safeguards on naval nuclear propulsion through no fault of its own, because no non-nuclear-weapon State has yet acquired or operated nuclear powered submarines.
The ground reality is quite concerning as, reportedly, the Secretariat was prepared to accept the excessively restrictive “special procedures” proposed by the Brazilian Navy until dissuaded by another verification entity. Hence, there is no assurance that unduly restrictive arrangements proposed to the Secretariat would not accepted by it, because of its lack of technical expertise on the naval nuclear propulsion fuel cycle (though as noted below, the Agency does have decades of experience in safeguarding various types of land-based nuclear reactors in non-military applications).
In Brazil’s view, naval nuclear propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy.
Article III of the Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (INFCIRC/395 of 18 July 1991), states that “None of the provisions of the present Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy”. Brazil is a party to the NPT which requires under its Article III.1 that, “The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere”. Brazil’s NPT safeguards are applied under the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement (Argentina, Brazil, IAEA, ABACC—INFCIRC/435), Article 1 of which provides that Brazil (and Argentina) undertake “to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities”. But Article 13 of INFCIRC/435 requires that special procedures need to be implemented for nuclear material used for nuclear-powered submarines, which mirrors the arrangements required under Article 14 of INFCIRC/153. Thus, in practice, as in the case of Australia, Brazil is required to develop the procedures for non-application of safeguards on naval nuclear fuel. Again, as in the case of Australia, it is essential to develop a generic approach and model applicable to both Brazil and Australia, and any other States, including related subsidiary arrangements.
Article 14 is not a loophole and its purpose is clear. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and discussed at great length during the negotiations to develop the model comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Merely asserting that Article 14 on non-application of safeguards is not a loophole is insufficient. A more credible source is the official History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years by former Assistant Director General Fischer, published by the Agency in 1987, states that:
“In the 1960s, when the NPT was being negotiated, it was reported that Italy was planning to build a nuclear-powered naval tender and that the Dutch navy was interested in building nuclear submarines. Since the IAEA would not be allowed to inspect warships (and it was doubtful whether it had the authority do so under its Statute) it was agreed that safeguards in NPT non-nuclear-weapon States would apply only to nuclear material ‘in peaceful nuclear activities’.
It was generally recognized that this was a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the Treaty. A State might simply refuse access to IAEA inspectors, claiming that the material they wanted to inspect was destined for a naval reactor, or that the reactor they wanted to look at was the prototype of a submarine engine. The Director General had drawn the attention of the Safeguards Committee (1970) to the problem. The Secretariat had done its best to block the loophole by proposing several conditions to the Committee (which it accepted and incorporated into INFCIRC/153) that the State concerned would have to comply with before withdrawing nuclear material from safeguards for non-explosive military use…. In 1987, however, the Canadian Government made the surprising announcement that it planned to acquire a flotilla of nuclear submarines and to spend several billion dollars in doing so.
Seeing the possibility of very lucrative contracts, the United Kingdom, France and the USA appeared to be ready to overlook the repercussions that the first use of the loophole in the NPT might have on the credibility of IAEA safeguards, and appeared eager to provide Canada with its nuclear flotilla or the reactors and fuel it would need” [emphasis added].
Of course, this “loophole” already had been recognized earlier in my 1988 analysis, Opening Pandora’s Box: Nuclear Powered Submarines and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Aurora Papers 8), and confirmed in the official history of the Agency.
It is claimed by some States that there is a tradition or principle that all new safeguards approaches have been developed through a consensus approach by the Board of Governors and that such precedent requires an intergovernmental process —this claim is false.
The record of the Agency in developing safeguards approaches is clear and incontrovertible. The negotiation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) was carried in Committee 22 of the Board, the negotiation of the Additional Protocol in Committee 24 of the Board, “93+2” (1993-1995) safeguards strengthening measures in open-ended consultations in the Board as was the matter of the recission of small quantities protocols in 2005, and Committee 25 (Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, 2005-2007) discussed further safeguards strengthening measures but was adjourned sine die.
These safeguards negotiations and discussions concerned all Member States in one way or another, were related to the NPT and Agency safeguards, and thus were conducted in formats involving all interested Member States. The same precedents would apply to the matter of interpreting the framework arrangements and special procedures in connection with naval nuclear propulsion.
In contrast, the Trilateral Initiative and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement between Russia, the United States, concerned verification and monitoring by the IAEA of the disposition of fissile material and plutonium declared excess to military needs in the two countries. Verification and monitoring procedures were discussed in a trilateral format as these were not regular Agency safeguards and were outside any international treaty framework such as the NPT or nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
In addition, it is useful to recall that at the workshop held, on 10 May 2024, at the Agency on naval nuclear propulsion, the Secretariat affirmed that, “Since 1959, all safeguards documents (e.g. Inspector Document, first safeguards system (INFCIRC/26) and its subsequent revisions (INFCIRC/66, Rev. 1 and 2), INFCIRC/153, INFCIRC/540 and Safeguards Confidentiality Regime (1997) were developed by MS [Member States] in the framework of the Board or its Safeguards Committees and approved by the Board” (INFCIRC/1213).
Can the IAEA meet all of its safeguards technical objectives throughout the naval nuclear propulsion lifecycle with the tools and authority available under the arrangement envisaged under Article 14 of INFCIRC/153?
This is a valid concern and the only credible modality that can provide the required assurances to all concerned Member States is to review, assess and develop the safeguards approach and technical objectives for non-application of safeguards on naval nuclear propulsion in an open, transparent and accountable manner; not behind closed doors.
Does the State engaging in naval nuclear propulsion and related non-application of safeguards have a strong and consistent track record of non-proliferation and compliance with IAEA safeguards?
Again, this is a laudable goal and should be followed, however States’ security concerns can change over time affecting their non-proliferation policy and behaviour. Thus, the Agency requires annual safeguards conclusions (including the broader conclusion under the additional protocol). The annual determination must remain with the Agency and not vulnerable to subjective evaluations of other States.
Naval nuclear propulsion could involve transfer of weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium from a NPT nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State, outside of Agency comprehensive safeguards.
Recent developments have revealed flaws in the NPT which is regarded as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Treaty essentially was based on drafts by the USSR and the US and negotiated at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. Its membership included the original members of Ten Nation Disarmament Committee: (Western Bloc)—Canada, Italy, France, United Kingdom, United States, and (Eastern Bloc) – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union; plus non-aligned States: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic (UAR). The interests of the developed States dominated such that Article III.1 of the NPT requires safeguards only on “peaceful” nuclear activities exempting military activities such as naval nuclear propulsion, the production of weapon-usable fissile material was not prohibited – hence non-nuclear-weapon States can import, produce and use weapon-grade fissile materials provided these are declared to the Agency for peaceful uses and placed under safeguards. Both the USSR and the US transferred highly-enriched uranium fuel for research reactors to non-nuclear-weapon States under respective bilateral safeguards. This material was repatriated later under the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Programme to Russia and the US. This loophole in the Treaty institutionalized in INFCIRC/153 is now creating a problem for the Agency and NPT States parties.
Agency Safeguards at Sea
For nearly three years now, the Board and the Secretariat have been grappling with the matter of non-application of safeguards on naval nuclear propulsion with little or no progress and continuing differences. To add to the confusion, there are reports that nuclear propulsion for commercial (or cargo) ships could be revived.
As was correctly noted by Brazil at the side-event on 25 May at the NPT PrepCom in Geneva, at a basic level nuclear propulsion units for naval platforms and for civilian ships including ice breakers essentially are the same technology. A small modular nuclear reactor generating thermal energy by boiling water to make steam to drive a generator to make electricity to power the sea-going vessel, with power rating between 70MWt and to about 300 MWt.
Inherently there is nothing specifically “military” or “classified” about such simple nuclear reactor technology, it is merely a nuclear power plant fuelled either by low- or highly-enriched uranium fuel. The military and classified aspects emanate from the characteristics of naval ships and submarines in which such nuclear reactors are installed as regard their military missions and military capabilities.
Civilian nuclear powered ships have no such restrictions, as did the now decommissioned US’ (80MWt) NS Savannah (1959-1971), West Germany’s 38MWt (6.6% LEU) NS Otto Hahn (1964-1979) and Japan’s 36MWt NS Mutsu (1970-1992), and the Soviet Union’s Sevmorput (powered by a KLT-40 70MWe pressurized water reactor according to an IAEA database, using 14.1% LEU) which is still in service.
SMR Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power unit (FPU), based in Pevek, Chukotka (Russia’s Far East), with two KLT-40S reactor units that can generate up to 70 MW of electrical energy. ROSATOM is currently working on second-generation FPUs, i.e. Optimized Floating Power Units (OFPUs), which will be built in a series and be available for export. The IAEA International Symposium on the Deployment of Floating Nuclear Power Plants, held in November 2023, also discussed this and several other projects under development.
Reportedly, in December 2023, the Jiangnan Shipyard of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation officially released a design of a TEU-class container ship – known as the KUN-24AP – to be powered by a thorium-based molten salt reactor, making it a first thorium-powered container ship and, if completed, the largest nuclear-powered container ship in the world.
It is reported that Rolls-Royce, the United Kingdom’s only nuclear reactor vendor with full lifecycle experience is offering “multi-domain applicability of …nuclear technology … [to] deliver the capability to support commercial and defence use cases in addition to the space domain…”, with a view to developing nuclear powered commercial ships.
All of these civilian and commercial nuclear powered ships and platforms would be under IAEA comprehensive safeguards when operating in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, because of their civilian nature. Reportedly the NS Otto Hahn was under pre-NPT Agency safeguards, the safeguards status and the NS Mutsu remains to be determined – more information on this could be made available by the IAEA.
This cannot be taken to mean that the Agency has long experience in safeguarding naval nuclear propulsion as is now being claimed by some Member States in the context of the arguments over non-application of safeguards on naval nuclear propulsion—most recently at the NPT PrepCom session in Geneva in July this year as well as in the Board discussions at the IAEA in Vienna.
Final Thoughts
This discussion has endeavoured to set the record straight regarding certain assertions and claims forwarded by those non-nuclear-weapon States that are interested in non-application of safeguards in connection with acquiring nuclear-powered submarines (including supplier States for this technology).
The current situation of some 20 Board members on one side, with the remaining 15 on the other side or abstaining, makes a mockery of the decision-making structure of the world’s most important nuclear governance international organization and is detrimental to the integrity of the Agency’s safeguards system as well as the safe and secure utilization of nuclear technology.
The IAEA Board of Governors must shoulder its Statutory responsibilities, shelve political rivalries and differences, and strive to regain unity and consensus on important safeguards matters before it. Failing to do so adversely affects its credibility as well as that of the Agency. The fabled “spirit of Vienna”, “Gemütlichkeit”, must rise again phoenix-like from the ashes of disharmony and discord.
If Agency Member States really would like to set a good precedent, the only truly responsible way would be to agree to place viable Agency safeguards on nuclear-powered submarine programmes with the direct involvement and participation of the IAEA. Member States should ask and assist the IAEA to devise in an open, transparent, inclusive and accountable
manner, a safeguards concept, a safeguards approach, and technical measures to apply credible safeguards to naval nuclear fuel and naval nuclear ship propulsion reactors in NPT non-nuclear- weapon States—this could be done without access to armaments and other parts of the submarine.
*Tariq Rauf is a Vienna-based independent expert on nuclear governance matters, formerly he was Head of Verification and Security Policy, Office reporting to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna, Austria). Personal views are expressed here. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Photo source: IAEA Board Meeting, June 2024. Photo: Dean Calm, IAEA
