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CIVIL SOCIETY, Democracy, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, UN INSIDER

Democracy in The Age of Disinformation and Digital Capitalism

InDepthNews

By Jan Servaes*

BRUSSELS | 2 February 2026 (IDN) — President Trump’s second term in office started with a crackdown on immigration, the introduction of sweeping tariffs and efforts to shrink the size of the federal workforce. Hours after taking office, Trump signed executive orders targeting diversity, equity and inclusion programs in business and higher education; reduced prescription drug costs; repealed green energy alternatives in favor of coal and gas, and started claiming rights on Greenland, and Venezuela, among several other issues.

Especially since the publication of Trump’s presidential memorandum of 7 January 2026, which confirms the withdrawal of the United States from international organizations, conventions and treaties that conflict with the interests of the United States, international comments have become increasingly harsh. 

How Democracies Die

But even before that, the end of democracy had already been pointed out. We have previously discussed the books by Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, ‘How Democracies Die’, as well as Barbara McQuade’s ‘Attack from Within: How Disinformation is Sabotaging America’ (see here and here, or here). They describe how, unlike in the past, most Western democracies are collapsing through the ‘misuse’ of democratic norms in ‘silent coups’.

Globalization and digital capitalism have created significant divides in society, making a reconsideration of democratic governance necessary.

With the advent of digital communication channels, the rise of social media, the formation of digital communities, and the restructuring of work and education, the digital revolution has profoundly changed the way we handle cultural norms and societal values.

The risks of disinformation have worsened in recent months due to new technological tools such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) and ChatGPT. These are user-friendly tools that can be used to create fake images, videos, audio, and stories. People no longer need a technical background to use AI tools, but can submit requests via ChatGPT prompts and templates, thus becoming masterful propagandists of their own agendas.

As we move further into the digital age, it is essential to critically examine the lasting impact of the digital revolution on communication and culture. By promoting digital literacy and ensuring equal access to technology and privacy, we can harness the transformative potential of the digital revolution to create a more connected, informed, and culturally enriched global and local society (Servaes 2014). Otherwise, “the algorithms that shape our technical infrastructures will perpetuate and exacerbate the inequalities and social divisions embedded in the tools that structure and shape our daily lives” (Orton-Johnson 2024, 200).

Finding a balance between the benefits of connectivity and technological progress on the one hand, and the need to safeguard individual well-being and privacy on the other, will remain a crucial challenge for the future.

However, the EU lacks harmonized policy measures to curb the extreme concentration of wealth and tax evasion by the richest. Oxfam has been advocating for years for far-reaching reforms, such as an EU-wide or national tax for the super-rich and transparency mechanisms such as an EU wealth register, to finance social needs, climate action, and development.

A European agenda to tax the super-rich and address inequality in the European Union has been long overdue, despite annual warnings from organizations like Oxfam.

Democratic Practice for Digital Capitalism

The relationship between democracy and globalization is a topic of both academic and policy debate. Some argue that the two go hand in hand—that unrestricted international transactions promote political accountability and transparency, and that politically free societies are least likely to restrict the mobility of goods and services. But others argue that democracies, in which special interest groups suffering from foreign competition have a voice, are more likely to have closed markets, and vice versa.

We borrow the following working definition of digital capitalism from Christian Fuchs:

“Digital capitalism is the dimension of capitalist society in which processes of capital accumulation, decision-making power, and reputation are mediated and organized through digital technologies, and in which economic, political, and

cultural processes result in digital goods and digital structures. Digital labor, digital capital, the digital means of production, online political communication, digital

aspects of protests and social struggles, online ideology, and influencer-dominated digital culture are some of the characteristics of digital capitalism.” (Fuchs 2022, 312)

A global shift is taking place. Countries are reluctant to collaborate across borders and commit to shared concepts and common standards regarding digital technology. The internet is becoming fragmented into multiple “splinternets,” shifting from an open, globally connected web to a “collection of isolated networks controlled by governments.” Individual countries are erecting digital walls by establishing their own rules for how platforms operate, determining which digital services and products are permitted. Digital solidarity is a thing of the past. Technological sovereignty is the new norm. Policymakers recognize that technological innovation equals power, and they are deploying their resources accordingly.

To understand this changing dynamic, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2025) has collected ten essays by members of the Digital Democracy Network, from countries ranging from Thailand and Turkey to Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda: Digital Democracy in a Divided Global Landscape.

Digital Democracy in a Divided Global Landscape

A first series of essays analyzes how local actors are navigating the new technological landscape. Lillian Nalwoga examines the challenges and benefits of deploying Starlink satellite internet in Africa, highlighting legal obstacles, security risks, and concerns about the platform’s leadership. While African countries see Starlink as a valuable tool for bridging the digital divide, Nalwoga emphasizes the need to invest in strong regulations to protect digital spaces.

Jonathan Corpus Ong and Dean Jackson analyze the funding landscape for countering disinformation in local contexts. They argue that a mismatch exists between funders’ priorities and activists’ desired strategies, resulting in “ineffective and exploitative work processes.” Ong and Jackson identify several opportunities for structural change, including developing broad coalitions of activists and strategies for localizing aid projects.

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri examines the role of local actors in foreign influence operations in Southeast Asia. She highlights three motivating factors that drive local participation in these operations: financial benefits, the opportunity to gain an advantage in domestic power struggles, and the appeal of anti-Western narratives.

A second series of essays examines the evolving applications of digital repression. Irene Poetranto argues that understanding government restrictions on online content extends beyond legal regulation and examines the technical aspects of internet control. Through a study of content blocking requirements in Indonesia, she demonstrates that the various tools internet providers use to filter online expression impact freedom of expression and access to information in different ways.

Gbenga Sesan describes the damaging effects of internet blocking worldwide. He argues that the loss of internet access creates unique problems for populations that traditionally rely on internet access for educational, economic, and interpersonal purposes. It is crucial, Sesan emphasizes, that stakeholders pay attention not only to the broader, disconnected populations but also to citizens who lack internet connectivity.

Steven Feldstein and McKenzie Carrier analyze the “AI-first” strategy of the U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). They draw parallels between Elon Musk’s transformation of Twitter and DOGE’s ongoing disruption of the U.S. federal bureaucracy. DOGE’s agenda, they warn, demonstrates how the deployment of AI tools and automated technologies “can destroy institutions, erase accountability, and allow corruption to flourish.”

A third group focuses on national strategies and debates about digital sovereignty. Arindrajit Basu warns of the Trump administration’s shift away from the principle of “digital solidarity” in its foreign policy. He argues that if a key goal of the United States is to counter China’s influence in developing countries, it would be wise for the Trump administration to “pursue initiatives that resonate internationally while simultaneously serving America’s core interests.” Iginio Gagliardone’s research on Kenyan gig workers and the data sovereignty debate in South Africa sheds light on “pathways for resistance, negotiation, and adaptation in the pursuit of AI sovereignty.” He advocates for “network sovereignty”—the creation of cross-border collaborations and governance structures among African countries to strengthen the continent’s ecosystem and trajectory.

A fourth series of articles addresses pressing issues in technology policy and regulation. Luca Belli’s article examines the intersection of cybersecurity and AI. He argues that AI has transformed the cybersecurity landscape, increasing the frequency, impact, and complexity of cyberattacks. Belli uses Brazil as a case study to explain how shortcomings in AI and cybersecurity regulations leave countries vulnerable to cyberattacks. He outlines how “good information and infrastructure governance, effective coordination among stakeholders, and robust capacity building” can strengthen countries’ cyber resilience.

Akin Unver describes the development of the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) framework, which has become the dominant method for analyzing information flow trends in Canada, the European Union, and the United States. He argues that FIMI has improved upon previous methods for countering foreign influence operations by and to systematize “early detection, data collection, and countermeasure architectures.” However, he points to several obstacles to the further development of FIMI, such as competition between countries, access restrictions imposed by technology platforms, and architectural differences between platforms that hinder responses.

These perspectives present new perspectives and dilemmas in the technology sector. They highlight the challenges that new technologies pose to democratic systems today. The goal is to help policymakers connect local and regional insights with international discussions.

Reinventing Democracy?

While the Harvard analyses and those of Macquade and others offered insights into why and how democracies die, others are exploring alternative solutions more extensively. One such work is “Renovating Democracy” by Nathan Gardels and Nicolas Berggruen of the Berggruen Institute. Critics note that the book not only provides a compelling critique of current governance challenges but also offers practical solutions to improve democratic participation and address economic inequalities.

Renovating Democracy

In Renovating Democracy, they address the three biggest challenges looming on the horizon: how the participatory power of social media has been a game-changer for democratic governance, the impact of digital capitalism on the future of work and social equality, and the challenge that China poses to a polarized and paralyzed West. It is not enough, they argue, for the West’s dysfunctional democracies to resist the growing influence of authoritarian states like China and Russia; they must first and foremost seek to repair themselves, or risk ending up on the wrong side of history.

The rise of populism in the West, the rise of China in the East, and the spread of peer-driven social media have led to a rethinking of how democratic systems work—or don’t. The creation of new classes of winners and losers as a result of globalization and digital capitalism also challenges our understanding of the social contract and the distribution of wealth.

The greatest fear of America’s founding fathers—that democracy would empower demagogues—came to fruition during the 2016 US presidential election, when the ballot box unleashed some of the darkest forces in the political system. In Europe, too, an anti-establishment political awakening, both in the form of populism and right-wing neonationalism, is pushing the established centrist parties that once dominated the post-World War II political order to the margins.

The election of Donald Trump and the populist wave in Europe did not cause this crisis of governance. They are symptoms of the decline of democratic institutions in the West, which, hijacked by the organized interests of an established order, have failed to address the disruptions of globalization and the disruptions of rapid technological change.

Moreover, fanatical populists are throwing the baby out with the bathwater and undermining the integrity of the institutional checks and balances that guarantee the survival of republics. The revolt against a dying political class has morphed into a revolt against governance itself.

Because neither the stakeholders of the waning status quo nor the newcomers of populism have offered effective, systemic solutions to the West’s problems, this has led to polarization and paralysis.

The Paradoxes of Governance in the Digital Age

These trials of the West are connected to, and largely driven by, two related developments: the growing fragmentation of mass society into diverse groups, amplified by the participatory power of social media, and the rise of digital capitalism, which decouples productivity and wealth growth from employment and income.

Gardels and Berggruen argue that these shifts pose two paradoxical challenges for governance.

First, the paradox of democracy in the age of peer-driven social networks is that, because participation is greater than ever before, the need for countervailing practices and institutions to impartially establish facts, make wise choices, mediate fair compromises, and build consensus that can support long-term policy implementation has never been greater. Despite expectations that the internet age would create an informed public more capable of self-governance than ever before, fake news, hate speech, and “alternative facts” have severely eroded public discourse.

Second, the paradox of political economy in the age of digital capitalism is that the more dynamic a constantly innovating, knowledge-driven economy is, the more robust a redefined social safety net and opportunity network must be to address the ongoing disruption and the resulting wealth and power gap.

To address these challenges, they propose a new approach to renewing democratic institutions. This approach integrates new forms of direct participation into current practices of representative democracy, while restoring popular sovereignty to the kind of deliberation that the American Founding Fathers considered so crucial to preventing the self-destruction of republics.

They further propose ways to distribute wealth and opportunity fairly in a future where intelligent machines are poised to displace labor, depress wages, and fundamentally change the nature of much work.

Where China Enters the Picture

When populists rail against globalization, which has undermined their living standards through trade agreements, China is usually on everyone’s mind. Few realize that China has been able to maximize its benefits from the US-led post-Cold War world order, which promoted open trade and free markets precisely because of its consensus-driven, long-term, one-party system. China has demonstrated that the path to prosperity is not incompatible with authoritarian rule.

In this sense, China’s rise over the past three decades holds up a disillusioning mirror to an increasingly dysfunctional West. The current US president, who came to power on a wave of anti-globalization, enjoys fighting his way through each 24-hour news cycle by firing off venomous tweets at all sorts of enemies. By contrast, an authoritarian Xi Jinping has used his influence to chart a roadmap for the next thirty years.

If the price of political freedom is division and polarization, it comes with high opportunity costs. While the West—including Europe, now torn by populist and separatist movements—is mired in internal bitterness, China is forging ahead boldly. It has proactively set itself the goal of mastering the latest artificial intelligence technology, reviving the ancient Silk Road as “the next phase of globalization,” taking the lead in combating climate change, and shaping the next world order in its own image. If the West fails to hear this warning loud and clear, it is doomed to fall asleep and occupy a second-tier position on the world stage.

This, of course, does not mean that the West should turn to autocracy and authoritarianism. Rather, it means that unless democracies look beyond the short term of the next election cycle and find ways to build consensus, they will be overtaken by the coming future. If the debate further degenerates into a battle over who dominates the viral memes of the moment, and if democracy means sanctifying the fragmentation of society into a plethora of self-interests, partisan tribes, and endless abbreviations rather than the search for common ground, there is little hope of successfully competing with a united colossus like China.

Unlike the Soviet Union during the Sputnik challenge of the late 1950s and early 1960s, China today possesses an economic and technological power the Soviet Union never possessed. Whether through conflict or cooperation, China will play a major role in our future.

Taking Back Control

To create a framework for rethinking democracy and the political economy, Gardels and Berggruen argue that the fear behind the populist backlash is rooted in the uncertainties that accompany major transformations.

These changes are enormous: from the intrusion of globalization into the way sovereign communities conduct their affairs, to rapid technological advances like social media and robotics, and the increasingly multicultural composition of societies. Both individuals and communities yearn for the dignity of living in a society where their identity matters and their concerns are addressed. Effectively aligning political practices and institutions to meet these challenges will make the difference between a polarizing world and a world that “renews.”

Renewal is the equilibrium point between creation and destruction, where what is valuable is preserved and what is outdated or dysfunctional is discarded. It involves a long march through the institutions of society at a pace that our incremental nature can absorb. Innovation guides the new into the old and cushions the damage of disruption, which initially outweighs the long-term benefits. In the new era of constant disruption, innovation is the constant of governance. The goal is transition through evolutionary stability, within societies and in the relationships between nation-states and global networks.

Gardels and Berggruen propose three ways to think about how democracy, the social contract, and global connectedness can be renewed to take back control:

  • Promoting participation without populism by integrating social networks and direct democracy into the system through the creation of new mediating institutions that complement representative government.
  • Revising the social contract to protect workers rather than jobs, while simultaneously spreading the wealth of digital capitalism by providing all citizens not only with the skills of the future but also with a stake in the “ownership of the robots.” They call this universal basic capital. The goal here is primarily to strengthen the skills and opportunities of the less fortunate—pre-distribution—as a complement to the redistribution of wealth for public higher education or other public goods. The best way to combat inequality in the digital age is to distribute wealth more fairly.
  • Harnessing globalization through “positive nationalism,” which means a commitment to the values ​​of an inclusive society rather than nationalistic rhetoric, albeit tempered by the understanding that open societies need clear borders. It also means scaling back the hyper-globalization of “one size fits all” global trade agreements to allow for industrial policies that compensate for the disruption of integrated global markets.

To mitigate the increasing rivalry, even the economic decoupling, between the US and China, they advocate for a “partnership of rivals” on climate action. Without a single area of ​​common intention, everything else will remain in the shadow of mistrust, leading to a new Cold War, the division of the world into geopolitical blocs, and worse.

In short

Gardels and Berggruen do not claim to be the source of all wisdom, but they see their analyses and proposals as a starting point that deepens and broadens the debate. Without concrete proposals to critique and adapt, the discourse on change is merely a lighthearted exchange that is ineffective.

The concept of governance in the age of globalization and digital capitalism is increasingly complex. It encompasses understanding how democratic systems function amid rapid technological change and global economic shifts.

The digital transformation of society poses significant challenges to democratic governance, but also creates new opportunities for citizen participation and institutional innovation. The way forward requires neither uncritical techno-optimism nor fatalistic pessimism, but rather a determined effort to align digital technologies with democratic values ​​and human rights principles. In other words, the future of democracy depends on our ability to create digital systems that reflect our highest aspirations for just, inclusive, and participatory societies.

 

*Jan Servaes (PhD) was UNESCO Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change. He has taught International Communication and Communication for Social Change in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the United States, The Netherlands, and Thailand, in addition to several teaching stints at about 120 universities in 55 countries. [IDN-InDepthNews]

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