By Marlies Linke*
ALMATY, Kazakhstan | 17 February 2025 (IDN) — The sixteenth BRICS summit, held in Kazan, Russia from 22 to 24 October 2024, bore the slogan “Strengthening Multilateralism for Fair Global Development and Security”. According to its concluding statement, the summit was intended to demonstrate that the participating Global South countries are expanding their cooperation on policy and security, economics and finance, and culture and human relationships, while a strategic partnership is developing that will benefit the nations involved by promoting peace, a more representative and fair international order, a renewed and reformed multilateral system, sustainable development, and inclusive growth.
Prior to the summit, Dmitry Peskov, press secretary to Russian president and summit host Vladimir Putin, commented that the expansion of the BRICS group and the clarification of the status of partner states would be some of the most important issues to be addressed at the meeting.
A multivectoral orientation
Which countries are eligible to become partners or members of BRICS required clarification because existing member states have different positions regarding possible procedures for expanding the alliance. This process of clarification continued beyond the conclusion of the summit. BRICS partner countries are not automatically considered candidates for membership, but rather viewed as “cooperating observers”.
The introduction of the status of partner as a step prior to acceptance as a member of the group—similar to the accession process established by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—is presumably intended to mitigate conflicts over the issue of membership. One of the motivations for such considerations may have been the December 2023 decision of incoming right-wing conservative Argentinian president Javier Milei to immediately retract the positive response of the preceding centre-left government to the invitation extended by the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg. As a result, Argentina did not in fact join the organization in January 2024.
While Kazakhstan’s acting foreign minister Kairat Umarov commented during the June 2023 BRICS Plus meeting that his country was interested in participating in the organization, a few days in advance of the 2024 BRICS Plus meeting, Berik Uali, press secretary to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, clarified that Kazakhstan was watching the evolution of BRICS with interest and would consider the invitation to become a BRICS member in the light of Kazakhstan’s national interest: “At present, and for the foreseeable future, Kazakhstan will not be applying for BRICS membership. This is connected with the multi-stage accession process and with other factors regarding the organization’s prospects for development.”
Even if this decision was primarily interpreted by Western observers as a signal that Kazakhstan did not wish to participate in another international forum shaped largely by Russia and China, it should not be read as a rejection of cooperation with the BRICS group or with participating countries. For example, in 2022, Kazakhstan—which, like other countries in Central Asia, has traditionally maintained close economic, political, and security ties with Russia and China—accounted for 81 percent of Central Asian trade with EU countries, and 86 percent of the region’s trade with the US. No doubt, Western counterparts have made clear to Kazakhstan that what bargains they are able to offer would depend on whether the country was to accept the invitation to join BRICS.
In light of changing international constellations, dialogue with middle powers that wield significant clout in their respective regions could be of particular interest for Central Asia.
Was BRICS viewed as still insufficiently consolidated to justify closer engagement? Or is it that the accession of South American and African countries has seen BRICS expand in a direction that doesn’t reflect Kazakhstan’s key interests—as member of the Mäjilis (the Kazakh lower house) Nikita Shatalov has claimed? “Kazakhstan continues to work”, Shatalov said, “closely with partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where it helps shape the agenda regarding discussions that affect the immediate interests of the great Eurasian continent on economic issues as well as security.”
On the whole, the decision ought to be understood as the latest demonstration of the country’s multivectoral orientation in foreign relations. Rather than seek preferential relations with just one country or bloc, Kazakhstan pursues its national interest by means of parallel interactions with various players, with the aim of avoiding the compulsion to align with a single camp. With this in mind, bilateral relationships are maintained with neighbours large and small, various Western states, and countries in the Global South, while multilateral cooperation is developed with a variety of states and international groups. The fact that the restrained reaction of Kazakhstan’s leadership to the idea of BRICS membership—at a time when Russia held the presidency—did not conflict with the expansion of a strategic partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan became clear a few weeks later, when President Putin made an official visit to Astana.
This multivectoral approach is not only characteristic for Kazakh foreign policy, but also for other Central Asian countries. Although no country in Central Asia has so far joined BRICS, the region has shown noticeable interest in a productive collaboration with the group and its member states. In 2024 this was reflected by, among other things, the active participation of government heads from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—all five Central Asian states—in the BRICS Plus/Outreach format. In October 2024, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two largest, most economically powerful Central Asian countries, were invited to become BRICS partner countries.
Intensifying links
For the participants, discussions during the Outreach meetings are welcome opportunities to present their perspectives on international and regional issues, to coordinate with others, to seek support for initiatives they may have already presented in other contexts, to attract partners and financial backers, and in these ways to strengthen their position and opportunities for development.
The first steps in this direction were taken in 2013 at around the time of the fifth BRICS summit, held in Durban. In 2015, Russia organized SCO and EAEU summits in parallel with the seventh BRICS summit. The BRICS Plus format was introduced for the first time in 2017 at the BRICS summit in Xiamen, where China, the host country, was keen to pitch its Belt and Road Initiative to BRICS Outreach partners.
As host of the 2023 BRICS Plus summit in Johannesburg, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa invited heads of government from numerous African countries and leading personalities from important regional organizations to take part. Similarly, Russian President Putin selected a particular set of guests for the BRICS Plus summit on 24 October 2024. In his welcoming address to participants, he noted that the Russian presidency had “invited Russia’s closest neighbours and friends who share a common history with us and with whom we have lived together in one state”.
The participation of multilateral organizations in the Outreach format is also significant. In 2024, in addition to states’ representatives, the general secretaries of the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Eurasian Economic Union were invited to take part. The aims and orientations of these organizations vary. The fact that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent also Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are simultaneously members in several of these organizations means they are well placed to coordinate their economic, trade, investment, and security activities in complementary ways.
Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev, director-general of the UN Office at Geneva from 2011 to 2013, views the UN as a key structure for making international relations more secure—even if, as he admits, the UN requires improvement: “While the various projects pursued by BRICS complement the UN and harmonize with it, the UN remains the irreplaceable universal structure. … The principles of diplomacy and dialogue enshrined in the UN Charter became cornerstones of the BRICS agenda, where they promote the peaceful handling of conflicts and the strengthening of strategic stability.”
Although BRICS countries’ activity within the organization initially focused chiefly on economic cooperation, the group has the potential to develop into a geopolitically significant platform with the ability to contribute to the strengthening of South–South cooperation.
The countries of Central Asia have developed strategic relationships with several BRICS members. Relationships with Russia and China, their closest neighbours, have been developed particularly intensively. Uzbekistan, for example, is linked to China by means of a “robust, comprehensive strategic partnership”, and to Russia by a “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance”.
The Central Asian countries have also developed significant strategic partnerships with other Asian participants in BRICS, for example Tajikistan’s relationships with India and Iran. In recent years, a 5-plus-1 format has emerged as a specific form for international dialogue between the five Central Asian countries: representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan engage in regular discussions with representatives of one other country or group (for example the EU). Whether a “five plus BRICS” forum will develop at some time in the future remains to be seen.
In light of changing international constellations, the growing importance of countries of the Global South, and the discussion around whether the future world order will best be characterized as multipolar or polycentric, dialogue with middle powers that wield significant clout in their respective regions could be of particular interest for Central Asia. Kazakhstan is itself a middle power. In Central Asia, a discussion is taking place around whether the region will be able to become one of the poles of a future multipolar world.
In areas of international conflict
The development of BRICS had its starting-point in ideas about how the global economy could be changed and international financial institutions reformed. Securing their opportunities for development is the most important aspect of the national interest of Central Asian countries. To do this, it is crucial to improve the conditions for economic cooperation and to successfully attract investments from as many reliable sources as possible. Both the development of bilateral projects with BRICS countries or through links enabled by BRICS summits and the organization of multilateral funding are important parts of this. They have watched with interest the build-up of the New Development Bank, founded in 2015 as a BRICS institution able to support key infrastructure and educational projects or regional initiatives and socio-economic development.
Given Central Asian economic actors’ close economic ties with Russia, they too have felt the effects of the sanctions imposed on Russian subjects in relation to the war in Ukraine. Trade and international payments, including within the region, have been affected. Whether alternative payment systems (such as BRICS Bridge) or the proposed diversification of currencies are ultimately utilized for business relationships with partners in the context of BRICS or the Global South, complementing the existing system, will depend on how viable they actually turn out to be in practice.
How vehemently such initiatives are opposed was made clear by an announcement that Donald Trump made shortly after being elected US president, demanding that BRICS countries pledge to forgo the use of alternative payment systems or else face the imposition by his administration of a tariff of 100% on imports from Central Asia.
Among the issues that are particularly important for developments in Central Asia and for cooperation with BRICS countries and institutions are those relating to resources and international transportation routes, climate change and water, the development of green economies and green energy, education and healthcare, innovation, digitalization, and security.
At the Kazan summit, Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov therefore laid particular emphasis on the effects of climate change on the highland regions that predominate in Central Asia and the initiatives being supported by Kyrgyzstan at the UN. Tajik president Emomali Rahmon underlined the importance of the subject with reference to plans for an international conference in Dushanbe on saving glaciers. Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized his country’s interest in collaborating with the BRICS research group on AI-related projects aimed at anticipating possible risks and developing consistent guidelines. Uzbekistan is willing to join the BRICS Centre for Industrial Competences, a project started in cooperation with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
During the BRICS Plus summit, representatives from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan also discussed security challenges. They advocated for multilateral responses to threats such as terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, as well as for collective efforts for dealing with regional conflicts and achieving global security.
Although BRICS countries’ activity within the organization initially focused chiefly on economic cooperation, the group has the potential to develop into a geopolitically significant platform with the ability to contribute to the strengthening of South–South cooperation. According to President Tokayev, BRICS is becoming an international centre of gravity, a point of convergence for the practical interests of numerous countries that are striving to work together in a way that benefits all participants.
*Marlies Linke directs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Central Office in Almaty. Kazakhstan. [IDN-InDepthNews]
Original link: https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/53071/no-balancing-act-central-asia-and-brics
This article first appeared in WeltTrends.Translated by Marc Hiatt and Marty Hiatt for Gegensatz Translation Collective.
Photo: President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrives for the BRICS Plus outreach meeting in Kazan, Russia, 24 October 2024. Credit: IMAGO / SNA
