Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia H.R.H. Muhammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Defence Minister of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia H.R.H. Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal, Syed Asim Munir Chief of Army Staff in a photo after the signing ceremony of Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) between Pakistan and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, September 17, 2025. - Photo: 2025

Shades of Collective Self-Defence in the Context of Saudi-Pakistan Agreement

By A.L.A. Azeez*

COLOMBO, Sri Lanka | 21 September 2025 (IDN) — What does it entail when two states enter into a mutual defence pact? What if one of them is a nuclear-armed state, not party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the other an NPT state, not possessing nuclear weapons?

That’s exactly the scenario that flashes across one’s mind when it comes to news reports about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signing such a strategic defence pact recently.

Having concluded a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) during the visit of Prime Minister Shebaz Sheriff to Riyadh, the two countries issued a joint statement highlighting some elements of the agreement. The full text, however, is not in public. It is unlikely that the joint statement brought out all the details. It’s mostly the case with most bilateral defence cooperation agreements.

The leaders of both countries appear content with the outcome. Pakistani media and official sources have gone further, calling it a historic moment. The principle of mutuality of defence against aggression and an accompanying commitment to deterrence against aggression are too glaring to lose sight of.

But how do other countries in the region and beyond view this development?

From Friendship to Formal Defence

By all accounts, it appears India is reflecting on it seriously. There is extensive media coverage. Think-tanks are abuzz with theories and perspectives about Pakistan’s deterrence capability, its reliability and strategic implications.

Israel is said to be speculating to strength-test Pak-Saudi commitment, but whether it would do so may depend on how the US views this development. Israel’s strategic autonomy in pursuing its own course in matters of perceived threat is, however, well known in recent times.

Saudi Arabia’s neighbourhood, the Gulf States, appear not to have had prior information or knowledge. However, at the Arab-Islamic Summit held in Doha a few days ago, the idea of a security alliance was reportedly floated, but without further deliberations or a decision.

Iran, on the other hand, is examining its possible implications. What would it be like, for instance, if deterrence is disguised as actually targeting a country or group in which there may be perceived vital stakes for the country? Would China be in a position to ensure there is no serious strategic security risk? As the global power that brought about the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And, also as Pakistan’s strategic partner?

The official USA is seemingly conspicuous by its silence so far. Think-tanks and political analysts, both Republican and Democrat, are venting their fury. Interpretations vary, with a cross-section viewing it as a sign that the Saudis have tended to move away from US security cover, if there was indeed a cover. and with a strong political lobby projecting it as a veiled threat to America’s strategic security interests, inasmuch as it may perceivably entail any serious implications for Israel’s security.

Saudis may have realised the type of (mis)perception this was expected to cause. Their media remarks suggest that the signing of this agreement was not in reaction to recent developments in the Gulf Region / the Middle East. It is claimed as an outcome of long-running discussions even preceding the ongoing Middle East situation.

Importantly, however, alongside Saudi Arabia’s media remarks suggesting the agreement was long in the making, the joint statement seeks to cast it in the context of their eight-decade-long close bilateral relations. Emphasising that “this agreement … reflects the shared commitment of both nations to enhance their security and to achieve security and peace in the region and the world”, it goes on to add:

It “aims to develop aspects of defence cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression. The agreement states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”

Two key elements stand out in the joint statement. First, both parties aim to “develop aspects of defence cooperation”. This is interesting because Pakistan and Saudi Arabia already have defence cooperation at a working level, underpinned by the 1951 Treaty of Friendship and the 1982 Military Cooperation Agreement, which have facilitated Pakistani troop deployments, training programmes, joint exercises and advisory roles in Saudi Arabia.

Against this backdrop, it could be assumed, therefore, that the “aspects of defence cooperation” they are now committed to developing are much more than what already exists between the two countries, formalising at the same time whatever activities that take place informally or on an ad-hoc basis.

The second element, however, is to “strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression”, which means a joint commitment to deem “any aggression against either country” as “an aggression against both”. This may be taken as the vital aspect of mutual defence, in strategic terms.

Aggression vs. Armed Attack

The latter element appears to have a far-reaching impact. Any action taken in the interest of their strategic defence pursuant to this agreement has the potential to qualify it under Article 51 of the UN charter, as collective self-defence. It bears mention at this point that the UN Charter, through Article 51, doesn’t proactively provide for the right to self-defence, and it only affirms that the Charter doesn’t impair individual or collective self-defence.

The right of self-defence, in keeping with the Charter provisions, is exercisable by a country alone, which is known as individual self-defence, or by more countries, which means collective self-defence. NATO is an example of a regional arrangement that is committed to collective self-defence.

A marked difference appears there, however, between the term ‘armed attack’ that Article 51 of the UN Charter employs as the basis for the invocation of self-defence, and the term “aggression” that the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Agreement, as per their joint statement, refers to. The latter is conceivably broader than ‘armed attack’ in its scope and reach.

The North Atlantic Treaty (The Washington Treaty / NATO Treaty), which established NATO, employs, in Article 5, only the term ‘armed attack’ although the North Atlantic Council, its policy-making body, over the decades, broadened the scope of ‘armed attack’, extending it to the source of origin of an armed attack as well.

That’s how ‘terrorism’ was interpreted to be a trigger for the exercise of collective self-defence following the 9/11 attacks in the US.

Strikingly, it was the US that had some aspersions over the potential interpretation of the term ‘armed attack’ at the time the NATO Treaty was being drafted, way back in 1948. With Russian drones reportedly ‘crossing’ into Poland in the backdrop of the Ukraine-Russia War, apparently, there is hesitancy on the part of the Trump administration to rush to a conclusion that it was an ‘armed attack’ by Russia against a NATO member, capable of triggering the right to collective self-defence by NATO.

Almost 4 years to the Pakistan – Saudi Arabia agreement, there was an agreement involving France and Greece, both EU members, concluded in September 2021. Perhaps, it sought to avoid the definitional challenges that the term ‘armed attack’ employed by the NATO Treaty initially entailed, and also the term “aggression” which, by definition, doesn’t necessarily always involve the use of weapons (economic aggression and cyber aggression being examples).

Furthermore, the question arises as to why France and Greece, as NATO members, deemed it necessary to conclude a separate agreement from the NATO Treaty, when collective self-defence is available under that regional arrangement.

An important factor that necessitated it was the strategic exclusion of France from what could have been the Pacific strategic defence cooperation arrangement. Instead of with France, Australia later went ahead, tying up with the US and the UK in creating AUKUS.

Against this backdrop, the France-Greece agreement is seen as a face-saver for France. This notwithstanding, perhaps in an attempt to lift collective self-defence out of its definitional limbo, the France-Greece security and defence cooperation agreement employs a specific term ‘armed aggression’, not ‘armed attack’ nor ‘aggression’.

Article 2 of the agreement, elucidating this point, states:

“The Parties shall provide each other with assistance, with all appropriate means at their disposal, if necessary, by the use of armed force, if they jointly find that an armed aggression is taking place against the territory of one of the two, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

In light of the foregoing, bringing the focus back to the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement, it is possible to argue that its scope is apparently broader inasmuch as the term ‘aggression’ implies different forms of aggression, including armed or military aggression.

Regional Ripples and Strategic Implications

So, the obvious question that can be raised is two-fold, with several subsets. The first is it so intended by this agreement that Pakistan would come to Saudi Arabia’s aid in the event of an armed aggression against the latter, or would it deter such an armed aggression against Saudi Arabia? Depending on the source and the extent of armed aggression, is it an option to use nuclear deterrence in such a scenario?

Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear-armed state. It commands economic power, however. So, the second limb of the question is whether it is so intended that Saudi Arabia would come to Pakistan’s aid if the latter is subject, for instance, to an economic aggression, or it would provide economic assistance as part of its collective self-defence undertaking.

It is possible that these questions may be dismissed as too academic, but to conclude a bilateral agreement of this nature at a time when an armed attack has taken place against a fellow GCC state can hardly be an exercise in futility. That is so even as it is claimed that the bilateral efforts resulting in the agreement preceded the ongoing situation in the Gulf region / the Middle East.

*Ambassador A.L.A. Azeez is the former Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva. [IDN-InDepthNews]

Image: Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia H.R.H. Muhammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Defence Minister of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia H.R.H. Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal, Syed Asim Munir Chief of Army Staff in a photo after the signing ceremony of Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) between Pakistan and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, September 17, 2025. Source: https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/

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