Multipolar Africa: As the U.S. Steps Back, a New World Arrives

A New Scramble, A New Sovereignty

By Ramesh Jaura

This analysis was first published on https://rjaura.substack.com

BERLIN | 2 August 2025 (IDN) — A quiet yet profound transformation is underway in Africa. While U.S. headlines remain preoccupied with Ukraine, Taiwan, and election cycles, a geopolitical reordering is playing out on a continent long viewed by Washington as peripheral — if it was seen at all.

This is not a rehash of the old “Scramble for Africa”. It’s something more complex: a contest not for conquest, but for relevance. As the United States gradually retreats from its development footprint — marked by a hollowing out of USAID, stalled initiatives like Power Africa, and dwindling diplomatic engagement — four major actors have stepped into the breach: China, the European Union, India, and Russia. Now joined by East Asian democracies like Japan and South Korea, these nations are reshaping Africa’s development choices — and its role in the world order.

Africa today is not merely the stage. It is also the scriptwriter. And increasingly, it is playing the suitors off one another with remarkable dexterity.

The American Fadeout

In the first decade of the 21st century, U.S.-Africa relations seemed poised for a new era. Landmark efforts, such as PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and Feed the Future, defined a vision of development tied to American soft power. In 2014, President Obama hosted the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, promising a new “partnership of equals.” The continent was cast not as a charity case but as a frontier of growth. Between 2004 and 2014, U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa doubled, reaching over $8 billion annually.

Then came the reversal.

Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, U.S. strategy in Africa has drifted. The numbers tell the story: USAID’s budget authority dropped from $23.2 billion in FY2016 to $19.3 billion by FY2022. Critical programs in governance and agriculture have seen reductions of nearly 25% in the past five years. Field offices in states like South Sudan and Burkina Faso have been shuttered. In the meantime, the Peace Corps has yet to return to pre-pandemic levels, while PEPFAR — once the crown jewel of bipartisan goodwill — faces proposed cuts exceeding $1 billion.

Policy, too, has shifted. Development goals have taken a back seat to securitised priorities, including counterterrorism, migration deterrence, and, above all, “strategic competition with China.”

In Africa’s capitals — Nairobi, Accra, Addis Ababa, Lagos — the message is clear: the U.S. is no longer the central player it once was. It is still welcome. It is still respected. But it is no longer indispensable.

China’s Speed, Scale, and Strategic Patience

Into this vacuum, China has surged with an approach that is at once pragmatic and audacious.

Since 2000, Beijing has lent more than $170 billion to African governments and state-owned enterprises. It has built over 10,000 km of railways, 100,000 km of roads, 60 large dams, and dozens of ports, airports, power grids, and industrial parks across the continent. In many places, Chinese firms operate with breathtaking speed: where a U.S. grant might take five years to approve and disburse, China can break ground in six months and deliver in eighteen.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), now in its 24th year, has become Africa’s premier diplomatic forum with a non-Western power. As of 2021, China-Africa trade stood at $254 billion — nearly double the U.S.-Africa trade — and Chinese firms have established a significant presence across the energy, telecommunications, construction, and logistics sectors.

But the model comes with caveats. China’s loans, although often concessional, have raised concerns about debt in countries such as Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Environmental reviews are frequently waived or rushed. Huawei and ZTE — flagship Chinese telecom giants — are wiring national 5G networks and surveillance systems under the “smart cities” banner, often exporting digital authoritarianism alongside connectivity.

Still, for African leaders seeking infrastructure, not lectures, the appeal is undeniable. Beijing offers hardware, financing, and a governance model that prioritises performance over process — development without democratisation.

Europe’s Dilemma: Values vs. Influence

The European Union remains Africa’s largest donor and trade partner, responsible for more than €20 billion in official development assistance and one-third of Africa’s total external trade. But Europe’s engagement is increasingly bifurcated — torn between normative ambitions and geopolitical anxieties.

On paper, the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package — which pledges €150 billion by 2027 — promises significant infrastructure investments across digital networks, healthcare systems, energy grids, and transport corridors. It complements existing climate finance programs, supports the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and plans to boost local vaccine and pharmaceutical manufacturing.

Yet friction persists. EU aid often comes with conditions, including governance benchmarks, trade liberalisation, and migration enforcement. For many African governments, these resemble the old paternalism in a greener outfit. The EU’s refusal to overhaul its own Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which heavily subsidises European farmers, continues to undercut African agribusiness in global markets.

Nonetheless, the EU stands apart in one respect: it invests deeply in institutions, civil society, and regional integration. Where China focuses on bilateral government-to-government deals, Europe backs rule of law programs, electoral commissions, and judicial reform. In doing so, it offers a version of soft power still grounded in democratic values — if not always delivered without friction.

India’s Rise: Solidarity with Subtlety

India’s footprint in Africa is less visible than China’s but no less meaningful. Rooted in historical South-South solidarity and common development experiences, New Delhi has prioritised education, health, technology, and private sector-led growth.

Between 2005 and 2023, India extended over $12.3 billion in concessional loans to African states and provided thousands of scholarships through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. Indian pharmaceutical firms now supply roughly one-third of Africa’s generic medicines. Bharti Airtel, India’s largest telecom company, serves over 110 million subscribers across 14 African countries.

India rarely builds massive highways or ports. Instead, it invests in solar microgrids, vocational training, and ICT infrastructure. The Pan-African e-Network offers remote education and telemedicine services to over 40 African nations. This “quiet power” strategy resonates with technocrats who favour capacity-building over capital-intensive projects.

In a world of megaprojects and geopolitical chest-thumping, India’s development diplomacy offers an alternative: deep roots, modest scale, and high trust.

Russia’s Gambit: Guns, Grain, and Geopolitics

Russia’s presence in Africa is narrow but strategic — more about leverage than largesse.

The Kremlin is the continent’s top arms supplier, accounting for 44% of African arms imports. Through the Wagner Group and affiliated private military companies, it has offered security support in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan — often in exchange for mining rights. In the Sahel, Wagner has become the security guarantor of last resort for embattled juntas.

Russia-Africa trade is relatively small — just $18 billion in 2022 — but Moscow leverages other tools, including subsidised grain exports, nuclear energy deals through Rosatom, and ideological affinity with regimes sceptical of the West.

While critics denounce Russia’s approach as neo-mercenary, it meets real demand. For leaders facing insurgencies, sanctions, or sovereignty pressures, Russia offers a no-questions-asked partnership. That bargain has proven increasingly attractive in a world where Western diplomacy often arrives with conditions.

The East Asian Equation: Japan and South Korea in Africa

While much attention has been paid to China’s expansive presence in Africa, two other East Asian powers — Japan and South Korea — have steadily deepened their engagement across the continent. Though smaller in scale than China’s involvement, Tokyo and Seoul bring distinctive approaches shaped by economic diplomacy, governance support, and technological cooperation. Both countries offer African states an alternative model of industrialisation rooted in transparency, innovation, and institutional development.

Japan: Quiet Power, Deep Commitment

Japan’s Africa policy has been guided by its long-standing diplomatic initiative, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Launched in 1993 and co-hosted by the African Union and the UN, TICAD has become a cornerstone of Japan’s African outreach, emphasising ownership, partnership, and sustainable development.

As of 2023:

• Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Africa reached $12.2 billion, up from $6 billion in 2010, with a growing focus on East and Southern Africa.¹
• Total Japan-Africa trade stood at $24.5 billion in 2022, with key exports including automobiles, electronics, and machinery.²
• At TICAD 8 in Tunis (2022), Japan pledged $30 billion in public and private investment over three years, including $4 billion in climate finance and $8.3 billion in private sector co-financing via the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).³

Japan’s strategy favours capacity building, private sector-led investment, and quality infrastructure over raw resource extraction. Key initiatives include:

• The Japan-Africa Infrastructure Development Initiative (JAID), promoting transport and energy projects under the G7’s “Partnership for Global Infrastructure.”
• The Africa Kaizen Initiative, which has trained over 30,000 African factory workers and managers in industrial productivity, drawing on Japan’s lean manufacturing expertise.⁴
• Technical assistance through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), with projects in over 45 countries focused on agriculture, governance, and disaster resilience.

Japan is also active in peacebuilding, funding programs for post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sahel. Notably, Japan emphasises a rules-based order, often aligning with Western democracies in UN votes and promoting transparent, debt-sustainable financing.

African leaders appreciate Japan’s long-term commitment, emphasis on quality, and lack of overt political strings. While Tokyo cannot match Beijing’s capital outlay, it is seen as a stable partner that brings technology, skills, and credibility.

South Korea: Developmental State Diplomacy

South Korea’s rise in Africa has been more recent but highly strategic. Drawing on its own experience of rapid postwar industrialisation, Seoul positions itself as a model for leapfrogging development.

As of 2022:

• Korea-Africa trade reached $23.2 billion, nearly doubling since 2015. Key exports include semiconductors, automobiles, and electronics, while oil, minerals, and seafood are the primary exports from Africa.⁵
• Korean FDI stock in Africa stands at $7.3 billion, with new ventures in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Mozambique, particularly in textiles, agribusiness, and ICT.⁶

South Korea launched its multilateral forum with Africa in 2006 — the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) — in partnership with the African Development Bank. At the 2021 KOAFEC conference, Seoul committed over $600 million in development loans and $1 billion in blended finance through the Korea Eximbank ⁷

Korea’s development model emphasises:

• Human capital development: More than 4,500 African students currently study in South Korea, many of whom are supported by government scholarships. Seoul also trains thousands of civil servants, engineers, and public health officials through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).
• Digital transformation: Korean firms, such as Samsung and LG, are investing in Africa’s tech ecosystem. In Rwanda and Kenya, Korean-led “Smart City” pilots are developing ICT infrastructure for governance and urban planning.
• Health and sanitation: KOICA has launched central water purification and maternal health projects in Tanzania, Ghana, and Senegal, valued at over $200 million collectively.⁸

Seoul also leverages its ODA-to-FDI strategy, blending official assistance with incentives for private sector entry. This approach mirrors Japan’s, but with a more aggressive pivot toward technology transfer and smart infrastructure.

In 2023, South Korea announced plans to double its development assistance to Africa by 2030, aiming to strengthen its diplomatic influence ahead of its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.⁹

Strategic Significance: Alternative to Hegemony

For African countries, Japan and South Korea offer more than capital — they provide developmental expertise and institutional strengthening. Unlike China’s megaprojects or Russia’s military entrenchment, East Asian engagement emphasises:

• Technical assistance and vocational training
• Anti-corruption practices and legal reform
• Export diversification and light manufacturing
• Digital economy partnerships

These attributes make Tokyo and Seoul attractive partners for African technocratic elites, especially in mid-income countries seeking to transition beyond resource dependency.

Moreover, Japan and South Korea are increasingly coordinating with multilateral lenders and G7 initiatives, including the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)—a Western alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Both Tokyo and Seoul now actively participate in blended finance mechanisms that de-risk private investment in fragile states.

For Washington, this represents both a strategic opportunity and a warning. East Asia’s rise in Africa underscores what is possible with a consistent, developmentalist foreign policy. The U.S., once a leader in this space, now risks becoming peripheral, watching allies take the lead where it once set the terms.

Africa’s Strategic Calculus: Playing the Field

What unites Africa’s foreign partnerships today is not subordination, but strategy.

In Senegal, solar farms are built with EU financing, Chinese contractors construct roads, and hospitals utilise Indian medical technology. In Rwanda, Germany trains vocational workers, China runs special economic zones, and Russian advisors provide security. Nigeria imports arms from the U.S., telecom gear from China, pharmaceuticals from India, and fertilisers from Russia.

This is not ideological confusion. It is multialignment — the deliberate engagement of multiple powers to maximise bargaining power, hedge dependency, and preserve sovereignty.

African states are no longer passive recipients of aid. They are active players in a geopolitical game whose rules they are increasingly helping to define. The AfCFTA — now the world’s largest free trade zone by country count — reflects a new ambition: to reduce external dependency and internalise development.

Voting patterns at the United Nations reflect this autonomy. On key votes — including those condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — African countries have refused to be bullied into blocs. Abstention is not apathy. It is an agency.

Washington’s Vanishing Act

For the United States, this should be a moment of reflection — and reckoning.

While China builds ports, Europe finances green energy, India trains doctors, and Russia ships grain and guns, the U.S. risks becoming defined by absence. Its signature development institutions are underfunded. Its diplomatic bandwidth is stretched thin. And its messaging is often more about countering China than supporting Africa.

Major initiatives, such as Prosper Africa and Build Back Better World (B3W), have struggled with branding, coherence, and delivery. Programs like Power Africa lack visibility. Public diplomacy tools — from cultural exchange to technical training — have atrophied.

The result is not hostility, but irrelevance.

In Nairobi, the most in-demand coding bootcamps are taught in Chinese. In Lagos, fintech founders are incubated by Indian VC funds. In Bamako, security hinges not on AFRICOM but on Russian mercenaries.

America still has allies in Africa. But it increasingly lacks a constituency.

Africa in the Driver’s Seat

None of this is to suggest that Africa is trading one set of dependencies for another. What makes the current moment extraordinary is the degree of choice. No single power dominates. No model prevails. That competition is a net positive — if African leaders can leverage it for long-term transformation.

The stakes are enormous. Africa is expected to account for over 25% of the global population by 2050. It will house the world’s largest youth labour force, its fastest-growing cities, and its richest untapped resources — from critical minerals to green hydrogen.

The continent’s challenge is not attracting interest. It is managing it in a way that prioritises intra-African trade, regional integration, and human capital.

The world has returned to Africa — not as coloniser or saviour, but as competitor. This time, Africa is not the prize. It is the player.

The Question for America

The final question is not whether the U.S. is being outcompeted. It already is.

The question is whether it wants to play at all.

For decades, American soft power has been led by initiatives in education, health, democracy support, and institution-building. That legacy still carries weight. But it cannot be revived with speeches alone. It requires money, people, patience — and presence.

In a world where roads, hospitals, and undersea cables define power, drones and envoys are no longer enough. Development is not charity. It is statecraft.

And in Africa, it may be the difference between being remembered — or forgotten. [IDN-InDepthNews]

Original link: https://rjaura.substack.com/p/multipolar-africa-as-the-us-steps

https://www.world-view.net/multipolar-africa-as-the-u-s-steps-back-a-new-world-arrives/

Image source: Pixabay

Footnotes

1. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “FY 2023 Congressional Budget Justification,” https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY_2023_CBJ_USAID.pdf.
2. Brookings Institution, “U.S.-Africa Relations in the Biden Era: A Reset?” March 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/u-s-africa-relations-in-the-biden-era-a-reset/.
3. Deborah Brautigam and Kevin Acker, “Twenty Years of Data on China’s Africa Lending,” China Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2023, https://www.sais-cari.org/data.
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6. Economist Intelligence Unit, “China in Africa: A Major Presence with Mixed Results,” The Economist, March 2022.
7. World Bank, “Debt Transparency in Developing Economies,” September 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/publication/debt-transparency-in-developing-economies.
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23. U.S. State Department, “PEPFAR 20-Year Impact Report,” 2023, https://www.state.gov/pepfar-20-year-impact-report/.
24. Kaiser Family Foundation, “U.S. Global Health Budget: Trends in PEPFAR,” 2023, https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-presidents-emergency-plan-for-aids-relief-pepfar/.
25. African Development Bank, “Africa Investment Forum 2023: Dealroom Statistics,” https://africainvestmentforum.com.
26. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “Digital Transformation and Smart Cities in Africa,” 2022.
27. Chatham House, “Africa’s Strategic Agency in a Multipolar World,” April 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/04/africas-strategic-agency-multipolar-world.
28. United Nations General Assembly Voting Records, 2022–2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org.